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CHAPTER I

FRANCE AFTER THE FALL

Following the military defeat of France in June, 1940 and the sub
sequent signing of the Franco-German Armistice on 22 June, 1940, the newlyformed government of Marshall Henri Philippe Petain^ faced grave problems.
From the end of June, 1940 to the beginning of 1941, these problems and
the ramous manifestations of them demanded solution or, at the very least,
alleviation for the immediate survival of France.
These exigencies were of two basic types.

The first chronologically

was the problem of a breakdown of relations with Great Britain.

But the

most urgently pressing was the problem of adjusting to and compensating
for the enormous material, territorial, human, and psychological losses
of the disastrous war with the Third Reich.

Three-fifths of France, in

cluding the more industrialized Northern and Western areas, with all their
productive capabilities, were lost to the Germans and physically occupied

4
Marshall Henri Philippe Petain (1856-1951), French General and pol
itician. Became a French national hero during W.W.I. In the interwar
years Petain served as Commander-inChief of Morocco (1925-26), Minister
of War (1-934), and Ambassador to Spain (1939-40). He became linked with
right-wing political extremists and displayed contempt for French Parl
iamentary democracy. Served as Vice-Premier in Reynaud government and
was designated to form a new government after the fall of France. He be
came head of the Vichy government on 10 July, 19^0 and presided over the
"national revolution" which made France an authoritarian state. Tried and
convicted after the war for collaborating with Germany and sentenced to
hang. His sentence was commuted by De Gaulle and he died in prison in 1951.

1

2

by the Wehrmacht. In addition to the Frenchmen killed in the war, the
loss of over two million people interned as German prisoners of war further incapacitated the French economy.

German control of the lines of

commercial communications and traffic still further limited the economic
viability of the unoccupied zone.

2

Massive problems of unemployment, ref

ugee disposition, physical rebuilding, and moral regeneration arose from
the rubble of the French defeat.

3

These were all internal problems and

had to be dealt with as such.
The dominating force in this internal policy area was the FrancoGerman Armistice, for through it, the victorious Germans held all the keys
necessary to unlock the chest of possible solutions.

Although not corny

pletely destroying the independence of action of the Vichy government ,
the Armistice sufficiently limited the possibilities for action so that
the Vichy government had at best "half liberty” to deal with its internal
problems.^

If the government of Petain were to prove foolish enough to

act too independently of or contrary to the Armistice, the Germans had the
right, as provided by Article XXIV of the Armistice, of removing what ad
vantages the French had accrued through the terms of the Armistice, and
of resuming

active hostilities, for which'the badly defeated French were

2
Adrienne Doris Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy: Vichy
19^0-19^2.(Paris: Librarie Minard, 1958), pp. 1^-15. Hereafter cited as
Hytier, F.F.P.
3Ibid.. p. 77.
h.
Vichy is a resort town located on the Alliers River approximately
200 miles south of Paris. It was chosen as the seat of government, after
a brief stop in Clermant-Ferrand, primarily because of its many hotels.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 13.

3

in no way prepared.

So dominating was the Armistice that its

shadow loomed over all negotiations between the two states
and all initial discussions dealt with the armistice and the
modification of its terms. It permeated Germany's foreign
7
policy toward France in influenced every facet of French life.
Relations with the Germans on questions dealing with the problems
of France's economic, physical, and spiritual rebuilding became, in the
days immediately following the signing of the A rraistice, the most urgent
need of the Petain government.

In these early days the only means of

contact with the Germans was through the Armistice Commission, estab
lished by

Article XXII of the Armistice, at Wiesbaden, Germany. The

function of the Armistice Commission was to "...settle and control the
carrying out of the armistice convention" and act "according to the ing
structions of the German High Command."
The supreme power on the German
side was, then, the Military High Command, or the O.K.W.

German policy

9

was to be formulated in and by the eight subcommittees , all presided over
by appropriate representatives of the Third Reich, and consequently to be
implemented by the military administration.**^

The stated mission of the

^By the terms of the Armistice (IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and XIII) France
was left with almost no war materiel. French troops were also disarmed
and demobilized. Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 15.
^William J. Potts, The German-French Armistice of June 19^0. and the
German Armistice Commission. 19^-0-19^2 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University
of Montana, 1966), p. 26. Hereafter cited as Potts, Armistice.
8Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 111.
^The eight subcommittees were Land, Air, and Naval Forces, Trans
missions, War Prisoners, War Industries, Foreign Affairs, and Press. Potts,
Armistice. p. 32.
*°Amold Lissance, ed., The Private War Journal of Franz Haider. Mimeo
graphed, Cory #26 University of Montana Library, Vol, TV., p. 104. Here
after cited as Haider, Journal.

4

military administration was to "establish calm and order in the French
occupied territories" and to utilize "the resources of the country for
the needs of the Wehrmacht and the economy of the German war.

The

French delegation to the Armistice Commission, whose task it was to nego
tiate with the Germans for solutions to the problems of occupied France,
was called the Delegation Franjaise pour 1 'Armistice, or simply the D.F.A.,
and was headed by General Charles Huntziger.

12

The D.F.A. was composed

of seventy members, each assigned to the committee relating to his special
13
area of expertise, J

This delegation, like its German counterpart, received

its instructions from and was responsible to a military authority, in this
case the Direction des Services de 1 'Armistice, or the D.S.A., created by
and under the dominion of General Maxime Weygand,
Defense.

14

the Minister of National

The D.S.A. in turn acted on the orders of and recommendations

from the "conseil restreint," a sort of mini-cabinet consisting of Petain
and his closest advisors.

16

Ultimately, then, the real authority of the

D.F.A. emanated from the Marshal himself.

**Pottsf Armistice, p. 31.
12

General Charles Huntziger was the commander of the Second French
Army at the time of the Fall. Headed Armistice negotiations and signed
the Armistice. Minister of War and chief delegate to the Armistice Commission.
l33ytier, F.F.P.. p. 112.
^General Maxime Weygand was b o m in I867, possibly the son of Maximillian I of Mexico. Attended St. Cyr. Chief of Staff to Foch (1914-23).
High Commissioner in Syria (1923-24), A m y Chief of Staff (1931-35), retired
until 1939. Then Commander-in-Chief Middle East until May, 1940 when he
was made Supreme Commander of the French A n y . Signed Armistice. Minister
of National Defense in Vichy government until 1942, then became Governor
General of Algeria. Acquitted of collaboration charges after the war.
l5Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 113.
16Ibid.. p. ?1.

5

The negotiations at Wiesbaden formed the major part of the foreign
relations of Vichy France with Germany in terms of volume.

More important

contacts were made,.however, and it was through these that the major dip
lomatic activities of Germany and Vichy France were conducted.

In addition

to its relations with Germany the relations of Vichy France with the outer
world, and particularly with Great Britain, comprised an important and,
perhaps of more far-reaching impact, secondary facet of its foreign policy.

After the signing of the Armistice Vichy France did maintain diplo
matic relations with other nations.

The most important area of non-German

oriented foreign policy was Franco-British relations.

During the months

immediately prior to the signing of the Armistice, France’s relations with
Britain had become increasingly strained.

The main reason for this growing

animosity were Britain’s inadequate and suspect military aid in the Battle
of France and her subsequent attitudes regarding the Armistice.
As the military disaster was unfolding in France animosity toward the
British was growing apace.

A frequently used example of the British reluc

tance to commit themselves sincerely to the Battle of France was their
action regarding the Battle of Arras on 23-24 May, in which the British
troops stopped their advance and began their retreat to the sea, thereby
dooming the desperate plan to reconnect the defensive line.

17

This episode

served to- confirm the French suspicions that the British desired only to
retreat and save themselves. , The fact that the French were not informed
of the plans for the evacuation at Dunkirk until fully a week after the
British orders had been issued still further widened the plysical and moral

l7Hvtier. F.F.P.. pp. 28-29.

6

gap between the allies.

18

The disproportionately high percentage of

British troops evacuated evacuated, a situation that was only partially.
remedied when Churchill ordered a prolongation of the operation to evacuate
more Frenchmen, added to the growing French animosity toward and suspicion
of the British.*^
Britain’s poor military performance led many in France to feel that
Britain had forfeited the right to hold France ot the terms of the Treaty
of 28 March, 19^0, the latest military agreement between France and Great
Britain.

20

One of the main terms of this agreement was that neither party

would seek a unilateral cessation of hostilities without the full and com
plete accord of the other party.

This clause was to become the focus of

the most important controversy in Franco-British relations immediately
prior to the signing of the Armistice.

Also in evidence was the growing

French suspicion that Britain had abandoned its commitment in hopes of
seeking a compromise peace with Hitler’s Reich at the expense of France.

21

Disagreement over the former point dominated Franco-British relations from
Dunkirk to Rethondes.

22

^Hvtier.' F.F.P.. pp. 28-29.
*^By 31 May about ten times as many British as French had been evacuated.
By 4 June the ratio had dropped to two to one with about 120,000 Frenchmen
evacuated. Ibid.. p. 30.
^Maurice Gargon, ed., Le Proces du Marechal Petain (Paris: Editions
Alton Michel,' 19^5)* Vol. I, p. 181 Hereafter cited as Gargon, P.M. .
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: MacMillan Co. 1948), Vol. I, p. 7?6.
Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.
22
Rethondes was the site of the signing of the Franco-German Armistice,
the same site of the signing of the Armistice of I9I8 . William L. Shirer,
The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19&9)»
pp. 878-879. Hereafter cited as Shirer, Collapse.

7

A fluriy of demands, conditions, proposals and counterproposals,
misrepresentations, and misinterpretations marked the climax of this con
troversy on 13-16 June.

The series started at a Supreme Council meeting

at Tours on 13 June from which emerged.a statement from Churchill sup
posedly freeing France from her obligations and giving her the right to
sue for an armistice.

The misinterpretation was fostered by the then

Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Paul Baudouin,
became Foreign Minister at Vichy.

23

who later

Neglecting Churchill's demands for-

guarantees concerning the French fleet, Baudouin repeated only Churchill's
statements of profound sympathy for the French.

Baudouin*s version was

accepted by his colleagues since Churchill failed to attend a French Cabinet
meeting on the same day as he had planned.

2h

On 15 June the French government sent a telegram to London asking
British permission to inquire, through the United States, about an armistice with the Germans.

25

At this time, on 16 June, the British, seeing

that an armistice was a very probable necessity, sent two telegrams to
the French agreeing to the inquiry if certain conditions regarding the
safety of the French fleet were recognized and accepted by the French.

26

23

Paul Baudouin was a member of the French Foreign Office prior to
the collapse in June. He became the first foreign minister of the Vichy
government and served in that capacity until he was replaced by Laval on
28 October, 1S&0. Supposedly a Fascist, he nevertheless rejected Laval's
position on collaboration and supported the more moderate one of Petain.
24Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 22. ,
2^Maj. General Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe. Vol. II:
The Fall of France. June 19^0 (New York: A.A.Wyn Inc., 1955)» p. 265. Here
after cited as Spears, Fall.
2^Winston Churchill, The Second World Mar. Vol. II: Their Finest Hour
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19^+9), p. 206. Hereafter cited as Churchill,
Finest Hour.

8

Had these telegrams been allowed to stand, with their provisions for sail
ing the French fleet to British ports, they would have given the British
a solid base for grievance against the armistice, at least in principle,
but they would also have removed France's main item of bargaining power
in armistice discussions with the Axis.

27

Neither contingency was allowed

to develop, however, since the telegrams were withdrawn shortly after their
reception, never having been seen by the French Cabinet.
In their place the British proposed the establishment of an "Indissoluble
union" between France and Great Britain.

This union would have provided

for dual citizenship for and ownership by both nations reciprocally.

The

British intent, of course, was to keep the French fleet and empire, of
which Britain would be co-owner, actively involved in the war.“

This =

scheme was immediately rejected by the French who were unwilling to accept
what would have amounted to dominion status in the British Commonwealth.
The telegrams of 16 June were then re-issued to the French but went unrec
ognized by the French government.

The British issued no formal protests,

so the feeling in France was that they accepted, at least tacitly, the
idea of a Franco-German armistice.

29

On 16 June the leadership of the French government changed, and Marshal!
P^tain, bent on sighing an armistice, replaced the more resolute Reynaud.
By 17 June the leaders of the new French government were issuing armistice
inviting statements.

On the same day Petain made statements in a radio

27Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 23.
28Spears, Fall, p. 292.
29Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 23.

9

broadcast that could easily be misconstrued as orders for French troops
to lay down their arms and cease all resistance.

30

Finally, on 21 June,

General Weygand received the preliminary terms for an armistice from Ger
many.

Given the military situation and Pdtain1s determination to end

hostilities, it was no surprise that the harsh terms were accepted.

A

preliminary armistice was signed between France and Germany on 22 June,
19^0.

31

The British, having failed to prevent the signing, reacted immed

iately.
On 23 June Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador, left his post
in France and returned to London.

This amounted to a unilateral cessation

of high level diplomatic relations although neither France nor Great Britain acknowledged it as such.

32

The real fear of the British, that the

French fleet would fall intact ot the Axis, seemed a distinct possibility,
if not a probability.

This fear was to manifest itself throughout the sum

mer and autumn and measures to prevent it became the main tenet of British
foreign policy toward France.

The French fleet, the only arm of the French military still intact
at the time of the Armistice, was to become, in the negotiations succeeding
the Armistice, the focal point of diplomatic contacts between Vichy France
and Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, those between Vichy and the
Third Reich.

Article VIII of the Franco-German Armistice agreement provided

^Shirer, Collapse, pp. 850-85^.
3lIbid.. pp. 882-883, 88?.
^'Paul Farmer, Vichy: Political Dilemma (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1955), p. 182. Hereafter cited as Farmer, Dilemma.

10

that
The French War Fleet, with the exception of the part
left at the disposal of the Government for the protection
of French interests in its colonial empire, -will be assembled
in harbors to be determined and dismantled under the control
of Germany and Italy, respectively, J
The vagueness and ambiguity of the terms was due, in a large part,
to the German realization that they could not physically prevent the ac
tivities of the fleet.

To the chagrin of his Italian allies, Hitler re

fused to dictate harsh terms for the fleet, wishing only to avoid its
defection to the British,

34

He further sought to prevent any pro-British

uprising on the part of the French fleet by offering to guarantee that it
would be fully restored to France upon the conclusion of peace.

As he told*

Mussolini on 18 June, "Above all the French fleet must be prevented from
reaching England..." By demanding no drastic terms regarding the fleet,
Hitler was, at this time, content to neutralize it.

35

The German govern

ment shortly thereafter issued a solemn promise to the French declaring
that it had no intention of using "for its own purposes in the war, the
French fleet which is in ports under German supervision..."
The Germans did, however, maintain some control over the fleet by
requiring that French ships have the permission of the Armistice Com
mission to leave metropolitan French ports.

The price for this permission

was reciprocal permission for the Germans to place consuls in French empire

33Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 14.
^ H u g h Gibson, ed., The Ciano Diaries (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday &
Co. Inc., 1946), pp. 165-166. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Diaries.
35

<•
Germany, Kriegsmarine Oberkommando, Fuhrer Conferences on Matters
Dealing with the German Navy (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence,
1947), Vol. I, p. 35, Hereafter cited as O.K.K. Fuhrer Conf.

3^Shirer, Collapse, p. 880.

li
territories.

This the French refused until the summer of 1$&2.

37

Germany

also required that all communication to French colonial naval bases from
OQ

the Vichy government be channeled through the Armistice Commission.
In spite of these provisions the French retained real control over
the fleet until it was scuttled in November, 19^2.

39

Throughout the per

iod surrounding the Armistice negotiations the Frence leaders were cog
nizant of the importance of the fleet, in relation to both German and
British interpretations and attitudes and their own needs.

The Navy it-

self, under the leadership of Admiral Jean Louis Xavier Francois Carlan,

40

the Minister of the Navy from June to December 19^0,^ was determined not
to be taken by the Axis.

A series of orders to the fleet from Darlan

immediately prior to the signing of the Armistice serves witness to the
awareness of Vichy to the possible intentions of both Germany and Great
Britain. On 20 June Darlan instructed all naval stations and warships
that "whatever orders may be received, never abandon intact to the eneny
a combat vessel,"

42

and assured the fleet that "in no case will it be

37
Gabriel Paul Auphan, "The French Merchant Marine," in France During
the German Occupation 1940-1944. Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and
Peace, trans. by Philip W. Whitcomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1957), Vol. II, p. 330.
33Potts, Armistice. p. 33.
39Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 15.
Lq
Admiral Darlan was Commander-in-Chief of French naval forces at the
outbreak of the war. He later served Vichy as Minister of Navy, Foreign
Minister, and Vice Premier. Assassinated in December, 1942 in North Africa
by an anti-Vichyite.
^ P a u l Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War II.
trans. by Capt. A.C.J. Sabalot (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,
1959), P. 143. Hereafter cited as Auphan , French Navy.
ho

Hytier, F jF.P.. p. 37.

12

delivered intact."

43

Qn:24 June Darlan sent another message to naval

units instructing that
Secret precautions for scuttling must be taken in case
the enemy or the ex-ally tries to take over a ship and use
it...In no case must they be left intact for the enemy.
Accompanying this message was a secret order to the fleet demonstrating
DarIan's complete mistrust of the British: "Disembark immediately all
British liason officers and personnel...Watch out for possible British
attacks."

45

When it became obvious that an armistice was going to be

46
signed Darlan ordered all French ships to leave British ports.
Petain, previously having decided that France was free from her ob
ligations to the British concerning the signing of an armistice with Ger
many, still recognized the commitment that the fleet would never fall into
eneiry hands.

47

In a statement to the British government on 23 June, For

eign Minister Baudouin attempted to assure it that the French government's
dominating concern has been to lend itself to no measure
which might make of France or any element of French ac^
tivity an instrument turned directly against Great Britain.
The Vichy government was, then, somewhat aware of the importance of its
fleet to itself, to Germany, and to Great Bid tain.

In this last case,

however, the French seriously underestimated the importance placed on the
fleet by the British.

This miscalculation was shortly to lead to one of

the sorrier episodes of the war.

^Shirer, Collapse, p. 855.
^ I b i d . . p. 889.

4?Ibid.. p. 37.
^ I b i d . . p. 44.

13

The emergence of the Petain government and the signing of the Arm
istice were shocking setbacks to British war plans.

The possible loss

of the French fleet to the Axis was the most discouraging and dangerous
aspect of the disastrous development.

Churchill in a speech to Commons

had declared that ''the safety of Great Britain and the British Empire is.
powerfully, if not decisively, affected by what happens to the French
fleet."

49

On 25 June, in a speech on the signing of the Armistice,

Churchill displayed his and Great Britain’s pessimism regarding Article
VIII and the attendant German promise not to use the French fleet:
...it is clear that the French war vessels pass into G
German and Italian control while fully armed.. We note,
of course, the solemn declaration of the German Govern
ment that they have no intention of using them for their
own purposes during the war,„ What is the value of that?
Ask half a dozen countries.
The British objectives concerning the fleet, considered a potential
menace to the colonial lifeline, were to keep as much of it as possible
engaged in the war against the Axis, or if this proved impossible, to
destroy it to prevent the Axis from gaining real control over it.

Wit

ness to this. latter intention is found in a telegram from Sir Dudley
Pound, First Sea Lord of the British Fleet, to Admiral Sir Andrew Cun
ningham, Commander-in-Chief of British naval operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean, dated 17 June stating that "...if France made a separate
peace every endeavor would be made to obtain control of the French fleet
beforehand or failing that to have it sunk.

That this contingency was

^%reat Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons),
5th Ser., Vol. 362 (June 18-July 11, 1940), p. 302. Hereafter cited as
Gt. Bt., Pari. Deb.
^Shirer, Collapse, p. 889.
51Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 42.

14

considered seriously by the British was proven less than three weeks later
when the British fleet attempted to implement the more drastic alternative
of Pound's telegram.
On 3 July, 19^0 a British naval force attacked the French fleet har
bored at Mers-el-Kebir, the military port of Oran, causing severe damage
to the unprepared French contingent.

This action was part of a British

operation, code named "Catapult," designed to seize, neutralize, or des
troy the French fleet., Two parts of the plan were carried off with a
degree of success:

the seizure of French vessels in British ports and

52
the internment and disarming of the French fleet at Alexandria.,

The

attack at Mers-el-Kebir and the repurcussions thereof became the focal
point of the breakdown of Franco-British relations in the summer of 19^0 .
It also served to alter, to the benefit of France, Germany’s policy toward
the French fleet and empire.
The question of the disposition of the French fleet was behind Bri
tain’s hostile action.

Churchill was obsessed with this problem, which

he considered as a life and death matter to his war plans.

53

That he was

fully prepared to take extreme action against the French fleet is obvious
upon examination of the ultimatum the commander of the British attack force
assigned to carry out operation "Catapult" at Oran, Vice Admiral Somerville,
delivered to his French counterpart at Mers-el-Kebir, Admiral Gensoul.

The

options dictated were to l)join the British fleet and continue fighting
against Germany and Italy, 2)sail under British control to British ports

^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 236.
^Robert 0. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy (Princeton: Prince
ton University Press, 1966), p.36, Hereafter cited as Paxton, Parades.

15
to be interned, or 3)sail under British control to remote French ports in
the West Indies, for example Martinique, and be demobilized.^

If these

offers were refused, the French commander was to order the scuttling of
his fleet or be fired on by the British.

This latter contingency was

provided for in an Admiralty message to-Somerville dated 1 July: "Firm
intention of H.M.G. that if the French will not accept any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed."-^

Admiral Gensoul's refusal to agree

to any of the terras caused the British fleet to implement this directive.

<6

The outward British objective of operation ’’Catapult" was to prevent
the French fleet from falling under Axis control.

But, according to

Churchill,' a more profound objective was also sought and satisfied.

The

act was designed to prove that the "British War Cabinet feared nothing
and would stop at nothing" to prosecute its war aims.

67

In view of Bri

tain's strategic objectives, however, the attack at Mers-el-Kebir did
little to insure the incapacity of the French fleet., Although a good
deal of damage was done to the French ships it was incomplete and many
capital and support vessels were left intact or damaged to a degree slight
enough to permit them to keep functioning.

58

The significant change in

^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 235.
55Ibid.. p. 23^.
56Ibid.. p. 236.
57Ibid.; p. 238.
68
'
■^The French fleet at Oran consisted of two new Battleships, Dunkerque
and Strasbourg, two old battleships, Provence and Bretagne, one carrier,
Commandant Teste, six flotilla leaders, and several destroyers and subma
rines. Bretagne was destroyed, Dunkerque run aground and Provence beached.Strasbourg escaped unharmed and the other ships either escaped or sustained
only slight damage. Capt. S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea. Vol. I: The Def
ensive (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 195*0» PP. 2if0-2i+5.

16

the French Navy brought about by the attack was an increase in anti-British wentiment among the senior officers, especially Darlan.

59

The damage done to the French fleet was negligible compared with the
damage done to Franco-British relations.

The initial reaction at Vichy

was a "spasm of anger, humiliation, and h a t r e d . T h e attack was viewed
as a "hostile initiative" which seriously endangered the maintenance of
relations with Breat Britain.^

Confusion reigned over the crisis since

the government had just arrived to make Vichy its "permanent" seat and
had not yet sorted itself out. Misrepresentation of the British ultimatum
at Mers-el-Kebir had been transmitted by Admiral Gensoul, in that he had
failed to communicate the "Martinique alternative."

Although this al

ternative probably would not have been accepted by Vichy, its omission
from Gensoul1s report made the whole affair appear more calculated and
brutal.

Although armed xri.th inadequate information, the Vichy givernment

now had to make a decision that would dictate the nature of her approach
to relations with Great Britain.
to or ignore the act of hostility.

The alternatives were either to retaliate
The former would probably entail a

forced military alliance with the Axis while the latter would eliminate
all hope of fostering good relations with France!s conqueror.

Character

istically, the .
’Men of Vichy" embarked on a policy of "indecision and

^Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle. Free France,
and the Allies (Syracuse, N. Y , : Syracuse University Press, 196*0, p. 85.
Hereafter cited as White,' Seeds.
^Paxton, Parades.' p. 37.
, 61Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 61.
62Ibid.. pp. 55-56.

half measures" which was to mark their future policies.
Indecision was not, however, one of Admiral Darlan's failings.

An

Anglophobe since the pre-war naval conferences, Darlan, "a strange mixture
of cold calculation and unreasoning passion," desired revenge on Britain
regardless of the consequences.

64

After agitating for a series of attacks

against the British fleet in a Council of Ministers meeting on 4 July, Dar
lan, moderated by the pleas of the Foreign Minister, settled for symbolic
air raids against Gibraltar.
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On 5 July a series of ineffectual bombing

raids was made against Gibraltar, satisfying Darlan's cravings for revenge
while preventing the immediate outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain.^
Foreign Minister Baudouin was not as resolute as Darlan.

Seeking the

middle road, he suggested severing official relations with Great Britain.
This was done ostensibly to placate Darlan and eliminate the possibility
of provoking hostilities with Britain.

Primarily, though, Baudouin's

action came in response to his interpretation of the sentiments of Petain,
who wished to find some way of expressing the displeasure of the Vichy gov
ernment without precipitating a resumption of hostilities.

Petain agreed

to the breaking off of diplomatic relations, noting that such'.a situation
had existed de facto since the departure of Campbell in late June.

68

^Hytier, F. F. P . p. 61.
64
Ibid.
^%obert Aron, The Vichy Regime 1940-19^. tran. by Humphrey Hare
(New York: Mac Millan Co., 1958), p. ,81, Hereafter cited as Aron, Vichy.
^Paxton, Parades. p. 72.
6*7

'Farmer, Political Dilemma, p. 185.

^Aron, Vichy Regime, p. 80.

18
/
69
Petain attributed the situation to Churchill’s "personal lack of balance."
On 5 July official diplomatic relations between Vichy and London were ter
minated.^
Franco-German relations were also affected by the British attack.

To

Hitler the attack was an evidential vindication of hia policy toward the
French fleet.

Count Ciano the Italian Foreign Minister echoed this sent

iment and stated, on 8 July in a conversation with Hitler, that it was for
tunate that he (Hitler) had not taken a harder line in regard to the French
fleet and that "by this intelligent handling of the fleet question, England
and France had been made mutual enemies."
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At the same time Ciano, and

probably Hitler as well, recognized that the British were not yet beaten.
Ciano stated that the incident
proves that the fighting spirit of His British Majesty's
fleet is quite alive, and still has the aggressive ruth^?
lessness of the captains and pirates of the 17 century.
As for concrete results, the French navy secured a greater latitude
of action as a result of the German interpretations of the situation.

Hit

ler was still unwilling to make any changes outside the terms of the Arm
istice, but the changes that took place within those confines were signi
ficant.

In response to the demands of General Huntziger for extensive mod

ifications of the terms of Article VIII, the Armistice Commission made some

^P^tain to Bullitt, 4 July, 1940 in Hull, Memoirs, p. 799.
^Churchill. Finest Hour, p. 238.
71
' U.S.Dept, of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D
(1937-1945)» Vol. X, p. 148. Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.
^Ciano, Diaries, p. 237.

concessions.

Having notified Huntziger that Hitler approved the military

measures already taken hy France, the Commission temporarily suspended
Article VIII, until the "situation was clarified.'1 By the terms this

sus

pension, the French navy was given considerable reign in a "zone of action"
centered around Moroccan and North African naval areas.
a significant softening of the
pyhrric victory for Vichy.
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This represented

terms of Article VIII and a real, if somewhat

The freedom allowed the French fleet was to be

come an important determining factor in the relations of Vichy with both
Germany and Great Britain throughout the summer and autumn of 19^0.

After signing the Armistice with the Axis powers, France's foreign
policy was dominated by attempts to solve the internal problems created by
losing a major war and the problem of maintaining their fleet and Empire.
The goal of the first policy task was to rebuild physically and morally.
Solutions to these problems could be arrived at only through negotiations
with the Germans.

The aim of the second policy area was to protect the

fleet and Empire from both the Axis and the British.
Given the realities of thesituation of France in the summer

of 19^0*

it becomes apparent that if the leaders of Vichy France, and especially
Marshal Petain, wished to solve these problems, they would have to carry
on simultaneous relations with Germany and Great Britain in each of their
respective spheres of greatest influence.
overlapped and had reciprocal influences.

^Potts, Armistice, pp. 35-38.

These policy areas naturally

20
The problems regarding the French fleet were the roost immediate and
the reactions of the French leaders to them were indicative of their approach
to the overlapping policy they had to undertake. A pattern was established
that was to become increasingly obvious throughout the period under consid
eration.

This pattern consisted of making and keeping promises to both Ger

many and Britain as long as those obligations did not encroach on the sov
ereignty of the French fleet and Empire.

In spite of the ostensible con

tradictions and inconsistencies, French policy remained, to a great degree
constant.

CHAPTER II

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS: 10 JULY-28 OCTOBER 19*4-0

By the first of July, the Third Republic had become, in certain
influential political circles, a hated and disreputable institution.
The problems faced by the newly formed government of Marshal Petain, *
and especially that of "moral regeneration" were thought to be impos
sible to solve through the methods of democracy.^ A strong anti-republican movement arose, led by Pierre Laval

2

who insisted on abolishing

Parlement and giving "exceptional constitutional powers" to the Marshal.

3

In so doing Laval hoped to establish a government more acceptable to
the conquerors of France.

Petain, averse to a course of such radical,

definitive action, wished merely to send Parlement on an extended vac
ation and rule ty decree in its temporary absence.

Finally, on 10 July,

after a series of extremely complicated political maneuvers, Laval

^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. ?2.

2

Pierre Laval first entered the French government in 191*4- as a soc
ialist. He entered the Senate in 192? and began moving to the political
right. He became Premier in 1931-2 and again in 1935-6. After the fall
of France in June and the "National Revolution" in July he became VicePremier in the Vichy government. He became foreign Minister in October,
19A0 but was removed from this post and placed -under arrest in December,
19*4-0. In 19*4-2, in response to German pressure, he once again was named
Vice-Premier. He retained this position until the liberation. He was
tried and convicted on charges of collaboration and executed.
^Shirer, Collaose. p. 904.
4

Ibid.
21
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Laval triumphed.

Sitting in joint session, the Deputies and Senators

voted, 569-80, to abolish the Republic and grant full constitutional
powers to Petain.^

The repercussions of this Republican suicide were

to be dramatically manifested in the changing foreign policy of the newauthoritarian Vichy government.
Pierre Laval, the architect of the decision, was rewarded with the
designation as Pdtain1s immediate successor.

Prom this powerful position

Laval assumed the responsibility of conducting relations with the Third
Reich, excluding from this sphere Foreign Minister Baudouin.

In effect,

from 10 July until 28 October, when Laval was officially installed as
foreign minister, the foreign relations were directed, often in mutual
ignorance and extreme secrecy, by two foreign ministers, Baudouin with
Great Britain and the neutrals, and Laval with Germany.

7

This situation,

along with Pdtain's lack of political sophistication, gave French for
eign policy its suspicious, often contradictory, and dualistic character.
Baudouin and a small clique around Petain tried to formulate some
policy toward Great Britain after Mers-el-Kebir.

At this time, however,

the problems of relations and negotiations with the Germans occupied most
of the time and attentions of the Vichy government.

Baudouin, excluded

from this policy area by Laval’s usurpation, made only a very few efforts
to mend relations with London.

Wishing to maintain some unofficial con

tacts, he-wanted to leave the French commercial mission and consul gen
eral in London, and his suggestions on this were accepted by the British

^For a full account see Shirer, Collapse, pp. 903-9^6.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 7Q
7Ibid.
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until they learned, of the conditions Baudouin wished to place on the move.
They were: 1)restitution of French warships in Alexandria and England with
their crews, 2)reciprocal restitution of French and British merchantmen,
3)payment of an indemnity for the ships damaged or destroyed at Mers-elKebir and Dakar (which had also been attacked as part of operation "Cat
apult") and compensation-for the victims* families, 4)lifting of the Mart
inique blockade, and 5) a British promise to let French ships sail where
they wished.

8 Baudouin strongly suspected these conditions would be re

fused by the British and indeed they were.

This feeble attempt at re

establishing relations failed and the diplomatic deadlock continued for
several months.
In the other policy area, the agents of Vichy were more active, al
though little more successful.
the German occupation.

The most immediate problems resulted from

Negotiations at Wiesbaden proceeded at almost a

negative pace and the attitudes of the German representatives were not
conducive to fruitful negotiation.

Georges Scapini, the chief of the

French mission for prisoners of war, stated that his task, the emancipa
tion of the P.O.W. *s, or at least the amelioration of the conditions of
captivity, was viewed by German officials as:a"begging mission."

9

Another example of Germany’s intransigence was its reaction to French
insistence that the government be allowed to return to Paris, as provided

8Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 70.
^Georges Scapini, "Prisoners" in France During the C-erman Occupation.
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford: Stanford Univ
ersity Press, 1957). Vol. I, pp. 203-2C&.
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for by Article III of the Armistice.

According to the agreement the Ger

mans pledged to
. ...grant all the necessary facilities to the French
Government and its central administration authorities
so that it may be able to administ^g the occupied and
unoccupied territories from Paris.
■The German position on this matter, as an example of its attitudes to
ward negotiations with Vichy, is well illustrated by a telegram from
11
Ribbentrop to Gtto Abetz,
his unofficial ambassador in Paris, on 16
August, directing him to:
Please continue to treat the question of the transfer
of the French Government of individual ministries in a
dilatory way,. Such a transfer is out of the question
at this time.
Further examples of the tone of the relations between Germany and Vichy
are equally illuminating.
The economic problems of the occupied zone were intensified in early
summer by the German closure of the demarcation line.

This action effect

ively stopped North-South commercial traffic and paralyzed the economies
of both zones.

The unoccupied zone needed the wheat, potatoes, sugar, m

meat, coal, steel, and manufactured goods from the Northern (occupied)
zone, which, in turn, needed the vegetables, fruits, wine, aluminum,

10Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 120.
11
Otto Abetz was the representative of the German Foreign Ministry
with the German Military Commander in France. He was given the rank
of Ambassador in August, 19^-0.

12u .s .

Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy.
Series D (1937-19^5) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1957), Vol. X, p. 491. Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State. D.G.F.P.
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and various colonial products from the Southern (unoccupied) zone.

In

the grasp of such an economic stranglehold, the Vichy government had to
make many concessions, such as allowing the Germans to appoint customs
and trade inspectors.

Going further, Vichy promised to

...orient France’s foreign trade in a way most apt to
increase the economic potential of the country and for
bid the export of products liable to be transferred to
a power at war with the Reich.
Interminable economic negotiations ensued, the main points of which sig
nified not only Germany’s economic demands on France but its general at
titudes toward its vassal.

Germany’s attitudes on relations with France were well illustrated
by the economic demands made by the occupation forces.

The economic ad

ministration was under the control of the Wirtschaftsabteilung. the econonim branch of the Verwaltungsstab. the non-military organization of the
staff of the Militarbefehlshaber in France, the supreme head of the Ger
man occupation forces.

The Wehrwirtshaftsstab. whose task it was to con

trol the French war industries, was the most important agency of economic
14administration.
Through these agencies Germany made exorbitant demands
on all of French economy.

France was, for example, obliged to finance

the German imports of French products, and a great imbalance between
French exports and imports ensued.

This enormous flow of goods from

France was made even more beneficial to Germany ty the establishment of
a 20:1 exchange rate for the Franc to the Reichmark.

l3Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 121-122.
^ I b i d . . -pp. 108-111.

Not only were French

26

goods pouring into Germany,' they were ridiculously and artificially cheap.

15

Occupation costs, such as billeting German troops, were outrageously
exorbitant.

France was obliged to pay R.M. twenty million per day, or

JfOO million Francs, an amount sufficient, according to General Huntziger,
to pay for the upkeep of eighteen million French troops and officers.

The

only way France would be able to meet these demands would be to print more
money, still further escalating the artificial devaluation.

16

The French

government had no recourse, when forced with these economic faits accomplis
and demands, but to pay.
gained just a little time.

Many protests were, of course, made but these
It was obvious that Germany had little desire

to come to fair economic agreements with vanquished France.

1?

The exor

bitant demands were justified simply on the grounds that it was, at that
time, impossible to establish occupation costs, so the arbitrary figure
was set.

18

If France were to prove hesitant to give in to these demands,

Germany would resort to military measures to force compliance.

19

These

aspects of the economic demands were but a part of the total scope of
Germany’s plans for occupation.

Territorial demands serve further wit

ness to their attitudes regarding the treatment of France.
The historical problem of Alsace-Lorraine again came to the fore in
the summer of 19^0.

Following the defeat of France Germany took rapid

steps to annex and colonize Alsace-Lorraine.

The first move was to re

establish’the pre-World War I frontiers, physically placing the area in

16Ibid.. p. 123.
1?Ibid.. p. 130.
18U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. X, pp. 438-^39.
*%alder, Journal. IV, p. 169.
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in Germany.

All French customs officials were replaced by Germans.

man legal codes replaced French law.

Ger

The large scale expulsion of "French

elements," Jews, and Catholics soon followed.

20

The French government

made repeated protests when, which was not often the case, they were informed of the abuses.

21

Germany’s response was typified by a memo from

the Director of the Economic Policy Department, Wiehl, stating that: "There
is no need on the German side to inform the French officially of the actual
state of affairs in response to their notes."

22

With the introduction of

the German language for schools, administrative agencies, courts, contracts,
and of the German civil administration, Alsace-Lorraine was in effect an
nexed. 23
At the same time Germany was making demands for military and econ
omic concessions in North Africa.

Specifically desired were fully equipped

airfields in Casablanca, radio-telegraph and weather stations, control of
the Tunis-Rabat railroad, Mediterranean harbors, both in France and North
Africa, and French freighters and crews to transport German goods.
this case, French protests were heeded.
via Wiesbaden.
mentioned again.

2k

In

Vichy sent the protests to Hitler

These were apparently heeded because the demands were never
This episode served to strengthen, at least temporarily,

the position of those in Vicly favoring a firm stand against German demands.

20Efytier, F.F.P., p..126.
21U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. X, pp. 4-98-4-99.
22Ibid.
‘ 23Ibid.
2\rar§on, P.M. II, p. 784.

2V t i e r , F.F.P.. pp. 132-133.
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The successful calling of the German bluff was again attributable to the
power and leverage provided by the French fleet and empire.

26

The policy goals of Germany, while at this time still somewhat neb
ulous, were conditioned by Hitler’s attitudes toward France.

As he told

Mussolini, "Naturally it must not be forgotten that France is the natural enemy of the Axis."

27

France, as the absolute enemy, was to pay in

many ways.-; for losing the war.

In a general sense, Hitler declared that

France "must pay and pay dearly for her responsibility...France declared
war without cause, was beaten and must pay."

28 Weisacker, the State Sec

retary of the German Foreign Office, claimed that "...Hitler did not want
to spare France; he world have preferred to have done a deal with England
at the cost of France."
economically.

29

Specifically, France was to pay politically and

Regarding the former, Hitler told Mussolini that France must

"...never again have a role of primary importance in Europe and must cede
30
to Germany and Italy, what is due these Powers."^

Hitler also intended

to meddle in the internal politics of Vichy, as witness his statement:
Our policy at this moment must consist in cleverly
playing off one,,lot against the other. There must
be two Frances.
In the economic sphere, German intentions were succinctly stated by

^^Ernst von Weisacker, Memoirs. trans by John Andrews (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1951)* p. 236. Hereafter cited as Weis&cker, Memoirs.
27
Halcom Muggeridge, ed...Ciano’s Diplomatic Pacers, trans. by Stuart
Hood (London: Odham Press, 19^8), p. 396. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Dip.
28Ibid.. p. 401.
2%eisacker, Memoirs, p. 236.
•^Ciano, Dip. Papers, p. 396.
Adolf Hitler, Secret Conversations, trans. by Norman Cameron and
R.H. Stevens (New York: Farras, Straus, and Young, 1953), p . -217..
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Goring, as delegate for the Four Year Plan:
It is an ineluctable necessity for domestic policy
that...the capacity and reserves of raw materials in the
occupied territories of the West be utilized rationally
and fully, to heop the Reich’s armament production and
increase the war potential.
It was obvious from the economic specifics already noted that the un
fair exchange rates, the ruinous clearing agreement, the ridiculous
occupation costs, the arbitrary control of the Demarcation Line, and
the introduction of German commercial and customs inspectors, meant
that Germany intended to make France pay a grievous price for having
lost the war.
In the more far-reaching aspects' of Germany’s policy also, France
was to pay.

The idea of a "world coalition" against Great Britain was

a constant dream of Hitler’s.

The basic plan was to "unite in an anti-

British front all nations willing to join...France is to be induced to
33
enter into a disguised alliance..."^

Count Ciano, reflecting on a

meeting between Hitler and Mussolini on 4 October, said:
Fantastic as that may seem, Hitler does not ex
clude the possibility of having the French forces
on our side in a Continental coalition against Great
Britain.
This coalition was to include Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain, Central Eur
ope, and France.

If France were to join the coalition, however, as Hit

ler stated:
she must clearly understand that... she must resign
herself to the idea of satisfying the territorial

-^Hytier^ F.F.P.. p. 153.
•^Haider, Journal.' IV, p. 225.
•^Ciano, Dip. Papers. p. 396.
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demands of Germany, Italy, and Spain, both in Europe
and in Tunisia,
This policy was not definite and depended to a great degree on
France's willingness to participate.
fleet and empire.

The key issue was again the French

The territorial cessions of the coalition idea had

to be handled delicately or, as von Etzdorf, the German foreign office
representative to the O.K.W. feared, France "will cease defending her
O
colonies and play them into British hands."
Hitler, in explaining the
French role in the coalition, reiterated German fears by stating that:
The most pressing task of the French is the defensive
and offensive protection of their A£ t 1can possessions, West
W : : and Equatorial, against England...
This "world coalition" plan contained all the basic elements of German
policy toward France,

France was to bear the major burden of the costs,

economic and territorial, of creating the "New Order."

Because of the

power of its fleet and empire, however, it was to be coerced instead of
crushed into agreement.

It was to this end that all German relations

with France were directed.

The German negotiators were soon to find a

representative of the Vichy government receptive to their ideas.

With the Wiesbaden negotiations proceeding at a rate too slow to
deal effectively with the problems created by the occupation, the leaders
of Vichy sought and discovered another channel.

The most ardent advocate

of negotiations with the Germans outside the confines of Wiesbaden was

^Hitler, Sec. Cony., p. 387,

37U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. XI, p. 527.
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Pierre Laval.

His attitudes were formed from several basic beliefs.

was a pacifist and had opposed France’s entry into the war.

He

As he told

his lawyer at his post-war trial, "Nothing justifies war be it offensive
or defensive...Tell me sincerely if everything, I mean everything, is not
preferable to war."
win the war.

His second belief was that Germany was destined to

This belief was shown in his question to the court at the

trial of Petain: "Do you believe that in 19*K) a man of good sense could
39
have imagined anything but the victory of Germany?"

His third belief

took the form of an abiding fear that, unless many concessions were made
to Germany, Great Britain and the Reich would conclude a compromise agreexnent without consulting and to the more extreme detriment of France.
His final belief was that Hitler did not x-dsh to crush France.
upon this belief that most of Laval’s efforts were based.

W

U-0

It was

He had to make

Hitler realize that "Germany was incapable of reconstructing Europe without the active help of France."

He further sought to make France ac

cept its role as a building block for the "New Order" and thus avoid the
hrx
drastic circumstances of refusal to work with Hitler.

The only -way

Laval saw to achieve this end of becoming an integral part of the "New
Order," was to work with, or as it was soon to be called, collaborate,with

38Hytier, F.F.P..:p.l47.
39Gar?on, P^M*., I. P. 539.
^°U .S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States.
19*1-0 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) t Vol. II, p. 330.
Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State, F.R.U.S..

. 41Ibid.. p. 378.
2|_2
Garcon, P.M.. I. p. f&O.

43Ibid.. pp. 539-5^0.
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with the Germans.
Laval was not alone in these beliefs.

There was a growing feeling

among the more "realistically minded" at Vichy that Laval's course was
the right one to follow.

The "anti-collaboration"group, headed by

"nothing but the Armistice" Weygand, however, had the largest portion of
the Marshal's ear.
In early

45

,
Petain did not, however, shut; ;off Laval's alley.

July Laval summoned to Vichy Fernand de Brinon, a germanophile

journalist and a personal friend of Ribbentrop, and the first Vichy French
man to have a personal interview with Hitler.

He was requested by Laval,

with the knowledge and approval of Petain, to go to Paris and establish
contacts with the Germans.

46

De Brinon was personally charged by Laval

to "study all the questions relative to the resumption of relations with
47
Germany under ny authority." ' Laval's personal representative first
sought out an old friend, Otto Abetz,
the German Foreign Office in Paris.

48

the unofficial representative of

While not overly optimistic about the

possible results Abetz told de Brinon to have Laval continue his attempts
in this area.
Laval made several trips to Paris during the summer but, as far as
could be judged from his tight-lipped reports, obtained no concrete re
sults.

In spite of this lack of progress, Laval became more arrogant

^^ytier, F.F.P.. p. 137.
45Ibid., pp. 137-144.
46
Gar£on, P^M., II, p. 728.
•

^Ifytier, F.F.P.. p. 135.
^ I b i d ., pp. 131-136.
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and disdainful of others' efforts at negotiating with the Germans.

49

His colleagues, kept from the facts of his visits by his scornful
secrecy, began suspecting him of trying to play his own game exclu
sively, above and beyond the knowledge and desires of the Marshal.

He

had to have had at least tacit approval from Petain for, as French dip
lomat Leon Noel noted: 'Without Petain, Laval could never have launched
or pursued the policy of collaboration."^

Petain was, nonetheless,

basically ignorant of the scope of Laval's actions, due to both Laval.*s
51
silence and his own love of secrecy.
De Brinon's friend and Laval's German contact in Paris, Otto Abetz,
was designated, on 3 August, as German ambassador.

52

His functions, as

outlined by a directive from his sole superior Ribbentrop, x-iere to advise
the military authorities on questions of a political nature, provide a
continuous liason with the Vichy government and its representatives in
the occupied zone, exercise influence in the desired direction on the
important French political figures, provide political guidance for the
press, radio, and propaganda and thus influence the formation of public
opinion in the unoccupied area.

He was further to assist Germans, French

men, and Belgians returning from internment camps, advise the Secret
Military Police and the Gestapo in the acquisition of important political
documents, and assist in the siezure of private and public artistic

^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 143.

5°Ibid.. p. 72.
^Acurious designation since traditionally countries at war have
not exchanged diplomatic agents. He was never accredited to the Vichy
government, which was never consulted about his appointment, ibid.. p. 114.
52U.S. Dept, of State, D.O.F.P.. X, pp. 407-408.
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properties.

53

Abetz and Laval had a close personal affinity, based on

their mutual desire to further Franco-German collaboration.
Although Abetz was a confirmed francophile, he was above all a Ger
man devoted to furthering German interests and goals.

He expanded on

his stated functions and created a confusing and complicated milieu for
his relations with Laval.

This complexity probably could be seen as man

ifestations of his desires to insert his personal opinions and intentions
into policy, and his tendency to overrate his importance and embellish
his accomplishments.

Hitler was not overly impressed with him and stated:

"Abetz is too exclusively keen on collaboration, to my taste."

54

As the

only German to have regular official relations with representatives of
Petain's government he was a key figure in Franco-German relations.

The

relations in Paris were to prove more fruitful than those at Wiesbaden,
though not necessarily beneficial to France.

The main tenets of Germany’s policy toward defeated France were
now established.

The agents for the possible implementation of this

policy were also available, willing, and in positions of responsibility.
If left up to Laval and Abetz collaboration would have become the by
word for Franco-German relations.

Other factors did, however, enter

into the diplomatic picture and these factors served to curtail the
abilities of Abetz and Laval to promulgate the policy of collaboration.

53Hytier; g J L P J pp. 134-135.
^Hitler, Sec. Conv.. p. 280.

CHAPTER III
FRANCO -BRITISH RELATIONS: 10 JUIZ-28 OCTOBER 1940

After the immediate crisis of Mers-el-Kebir had passed with no
serious reprisals Great Britain adopted a "forgive and forget" attitude
toward France.*

This attitude lasted only until the end of July when'

London provided new provocation in its continuing dispute with Vichy
France.

This took the form of the extension of the economic blockade

of Germany to include the whole of France and French North Africa.

2

Ex

plaining this action in Commons Churchill stated: "It is our intention
to maintain and enforce a strict blockade, not only of Germany, but of
Italy and France and all the other countries that have fallen into German
3

power."

The strategy of operation "Catapult" to neutralize the French

fleet was thus a necessary prelude to the extension of the blockade to
prevent supplies from falling into Axis hands through France.
The French reaction to the blockade was not surprising.

Baudouin

called it "an act of hostility, worse perhaps than the grievous assassiA
nation at Mers-el-Kebir."

France, always dependent on imports, had only

S/ins ton S. Churchill, Blood. Sweat, and Tears (New York: G.F. Put
nam’s Sons, 1941), p. 334. Hereafter cited as Churchill, B.S.T.
^Hubert Cole, Laval (New York: G,P.Putnam’s Sons, 1963)» p. H 5 .
•^Great Britain, Pari. Deb.. Vol. 364* p. 1161
h

Bytier, F.F.P.. p. 90.
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two options to consider if the blockade were enforced strictly for any
length of time: to starve, or to force the blockade by the -use of armed
convoys.

If the latter option were put into effect, open hostilities

with Great Britain would ensue, hostilities for which the French were
neither prepared nor disposed to undertake.^

The timing of the impo

sition of the blockade was extremely inopportune for both Great Britain
and Vichy France.

Churchill’s antagonism toward Vichy, at a time when

conciliation would have been more advantageous, caused Britain to lose
the chance for a possible amelioration of Franco-British problems and
edged both countries toward a war that neither wanted.

France was being

pressured by the Axis for more concessions and promises of collaboration
when the British blockade was announced.

The result of these two factors

was to push Vichy to the verge of war with Britain while, at the same
time, lessening chances for better relations with the Axis.^
In the late summer of 19^0 another block to Franco-British relations,
the Free French movement headed ty Charles de Gaulle, was developing.

In

June the British had agreed to allow de Gaulle to establish a French
7

"centre of resistance" in England.’

Soon after this the British govern

ment recognized de Gaulle as "the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever

^Hytier, F.F.F.. p. 88.
^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 190.
^Sir Desmond Morton, "The Free French Movement, l9^0-^2," Survey
of International Affairs. Vol. VII: Hitler’s Europe, ed. by Arnold and
Veronica Taynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 195^)> p. ^37. Here
after cited as Morton, "Movement.”
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they may be,' who rally to him in support of the Allied Cause."

8

The Brit

ish motives for supporting de Gaulle were anything but altruistic, for
they wanted to use him only as a military rallying point for any dissi
dent members of the French Armed Forces, simply to increase the numbers
9

of those fighting for the Allied cause.

The recognition of de Gaulle as

leader of Free France did not constitute recognition of him as the head
of any legal French government.*^

Recruitment of followers was a dif

ficult task for de Gaulle, especially after ’lers-el-Kebir.

From the

end of June, 1940 throughout the summer the Free French forces in Eng
land never numbered more than 6,000 men.**

Relations between de Gualle

and Churchill were not always on friendly terms as is witnessed by
Churchill's reported statement that "the heaviest cross I have to bear
is the Cross of Lorraine."

12

The Free French movement was given considerable impetus in August
with the signing of an agreement between de Gaulle and Churchill setting
up a modus onerandi for dealing with Free French-British relations.

The

agreement came in response to Free French requests that: Free France was
not to be used as merely a British foreign legion; Free France was to be
regarded as an ally to continue the war with her own army; and Free France

Q
x-Iorton, "Movement,” p..438.
^Ibid., p. 436.
*William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1-947),
p. 77. Hereafter cited as Langer, Gamble.
**Morton, "Movement," pp. 438-439.
*%isley Huddleston, France: The Tragic Years 1939-1947 (New York: The
Devin-Adair Co., 1955), p. 57. Hereafter cited as Huddleston, Tragic Years.
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13
was to be ruled by the constitution of the Third Republic.

The main

points of the Agreement were that: de Gaulle was to raise a French vol
unteer force to be used against the common enemies and never against
other Frenchmen; this force was to retain a strictly French character;
this force was to have prior rights to any captured French arms, with
the British supplying the difference; this force was to be under the
command of de Gaulle who, in turn, would agree to accept general direction
from the British High Command if the need arose; and the British Goverhment was to meet all costs of the Free French movement.

Corrolaries to

this agreement involved British acceptance, in principle, of de Gaulle's
plan to set up, in the future, a Council of Defense of French Overseas
Possessions.

The agreement also called for economic and security collab-

1*5
oration of this Council with the British Empire.
The Agreement of 7
August served as the basis for Free French-British relations until the
formation of the French National Committee in September, 1941.

The main

shortcoming of the agreement,' soon to be made obvious, was that no clearly
defined restrictions were placed on de Gaulle commensurate with the power
vested in h i m . ^
The British agreement to aid Free French colonies was soon invoked,
for a number of colonies of the French empire went over to de Gaulle and

^White, Seeds, p. .141.
14€harles de Gaulle, War Memoirs. Vol. I: The Call to Honor: Docu
ments (New York: The Viking Press, 1955)» PP. 24-26. Hereafter cited
as de Gaulle, Call: Doc.
1

rlorton, "Movement," p. 441.

l6Ibid. .» PP» 439-441
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17

Free France during the late summer of 1940. '

Britain and de Gaulle

agreed on the importance of acquiring French colonial territory from
which the Free French movement could operate.

Since French North Africa

was too strong, the main objectives of this acquisition drive were the
colonies of French West and Equatorial Africa. , In addition to being rich
in needed raw materials, these colonies also could provide a communications
link with Cairo, by air and road, via the Sudan.

18

The policy of the British

regarding this colonial drive was to exercise economic pressure on Vichy
colonies and promise naval defense to those that switched loyalty to
de Gaulle,

At that time the British government limited assistance to

that of a strictly "moral” nature to avoid provoking Vichy more than was
necessary. 19
By late August, however, Vichy was provoked.

The defection of French

colonies and the verbal attacks made on Petain by de Gaulle served to raise
to new levels the anti-British sentiment at Vichy. ^0

The loss of colonies

was especially distasteful to Laval, not because of any sense of pride in
the Empire,' but because they had been a valuable bargaining point with
Germany.

Laval considered the colonies "...a means of pressure, an

17
'The colonies that went over to de Gaulle were the New Hebrides,
Chad,' Cameroons, Middle Congo, Ubangi Shari, Tahiti, French India, and
New Caledonia. Ibid.. p. 443.
^^Morion,’ "Movement," pp. 441-444.
1<5

'Alfred Cobban, "Vichy France," Survey of International Affairs. Vol.
Hitler’s Europe, ed. by Arnold'and Veronical Toynbee (London: Oxford Univ
ersity Press, 1954), p. 359. Hereafter cited as Cobban, “Vichy."
*

20
Aron, Vichy Regime, p.206.

instrument.

21
As long as they are there, I can talk to the Germans.11

Laval considered the disappearance of this lever as serious enough to
propose declaring war on Great Britain.

22 Wishing to avoid any extreme

measures, however, Petain blocked this proposal.

At this time Petain also

began exerting somewhat more direct influence on the government and for
eign policy of Vichy.

By trying to legislate away Laval's powers as

"dauphin", Petain prompted a regeneration of the power struggle with
Laval,

23

The combination of the blockade by Great Britain, the siezure

of French colonies by Free French forces, and the Petain-Laval political
conflict created a dangerous atmosphere in September, 19^0.
London were again on the brink of a war that neither wanted.

Vichy and
24

The ingredients were present and they were soon stirred into a major
crisis.

The logical site was Dakar, the administrative capital of French

West Africa^ located on the extreme western tip of the African bulge only
1700 miles from South America.

Blessed with an excellent harbor capable

of handling any war fleet, this "Atlantic Gibraltar" dominated the trade
25
routes between the Far East, India, and Europe. ^

There were many rumors

of proposed German plans to establish a submarine base at Dakar to

Ai

Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the Scliose of France (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 223. Hereafter cited as Warner, Laval.
^General G. Schmitt, Les Accords Sdbr&ts Franco-3ritannique de
Novembre-Decembre 1940: Mstoire ou mystification. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957)* P. 37. Hereafter cited as Schmitt, Accords.
^Aron, Vichy Regime, pp. 207-208.
2^Bjytier, F.F.P.. p. 90.
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interdict British trade via the Cape route.

26

That Churchill recognized

this danger is witnessed by his letter to South African Prime Minister
General Jan Christian Smuts of 9 September, 1940 in which he stated " If
Dakar fell under German control and became a U-boat base, the consequences
27
to the Cape route would be deadly."

Churchill, in addition to desiring

to prevent Dakar from falling into German hands, wished to wrest it from
Vichy control to protect Gaullist colonies and use it as a future base
of operations for the recapture of metropolitan France.

28

These stra

tegic needs closely coincided with those of de Gaulle, who wanted Dakar
as his colonial captial and as a springboard for future operations against
Vichy.2$ ¥ith such agreement on the need for the acquistition of Dakar,
it was only a question of time until an arrangement for operations against
it would be arrived at between de Gaulle and Churchill.
The controversy over who first suggested the plan for the Dakar ex
pedition is not really relevant.

It appears, however, that the idea was

germinated in de Gaulle's staff and was then trasmitted to Churchill.

30

Discussions between de Gaulle and Churchill were begun in July, 1940 and
by August rough plans for the expedition had been adopted.

In a directive

^danger, Gamble, p. 82.
^Churchill, Their Finest Hour.~ p. 487.

28White,' Seeds. P. i?8 .
2^Auphan/ French Navy7 p. 183.
•^In a letter to Dorothy White Gen. Sir Edward Spears, Military liason
officer to the Free French stated that the idea of the mission "evolved in
discussions between my mission and de Gaulle's staff and was put up to
Churchill through the Chiefs of Staff Committee" White, Seeds, p. 409.
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to Lt. General Sir Hastings Lionel Ismay, the Chief of Staff to the Min
ister of Defense,Churchill states on 8 August that, in view of the danger
of the spreading of German influence in that area with the aid of Vichy,
"it would seem extremely important to British interests that General de
31
Gaulle should take Dakar at the earliest moment.""^

Churchill stressed

the French character of and responsibility for the expedition and expressed
his intention to allow de Gaulle to assume full administrative command of
Dakar after the expedition had been successfully completed.

32

Operation "Menace," as the expedition was code named, was to carry
out the siezure of Dakar in three stages.

The way was to be prepared

by the propaganda activities of Gaullists in Dakar.

Then, when the attack

force arrived, an open landing was to be made under a flag of truce.

De

Gaulle would then issue an ultimatum to the Vichy governor demanding capitulation of the city.

33

The Governor, Pierre Boisson,

34

seeing the British

fleet on the horizon, would hand his post over to de Gaulle.

The operation

was to be completed by nightfall of the first day of encounter.

35

De Gaulle

and Churchill were optimistic about the chances of success, the latter so
much so that he declared the Dakar expedition "was a pup."

The risks

of antagonizing Vichy to the point of war were minimized by Churchill who

^Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 475.

32Ibid.. p. 476.
33Auphan, French Navy, p. 188.
^Pierre Boisson was a career colonial service official. He was the
High Commissioner of French Black Africa. He'was described as "an intel
ligent, energetic man, as anti-German as could be found."

33Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 4?9.
36Ibid.. p.477.

"felt in irry fingertips that Vichy France would not declare war."

37

He

based his decision to proceed with the operation on more than a gut feel
ing, however, and his logic was clear in his statement that "if Vichy did
not declare war after Oran, or under the pressure of our blockade, there
is no reason why they should do so if there is a fight at Dakar. 11

After

several delays, therefore, task force "M" departed Liverpool under the command of Vice-Admiral John Cunningham.

39

Although he had learned on 11 September that a sizeable French squad
ron had slipped past Gibraltar, Churchill, after communicating with Cunningham and de Gaulle, decided to let the mission continue.

40

The French

squadron arrived at Dakar on 14 September, greatly adding to the defense
of the city and increasing the chance of defeat for the Anglo-Free French
i}l
armada.
On 18 September Churchill gave the operation commanders auth
ority to decide to continue or abandon the mission.

It was his instinct

ho
"to let things rip."
De Gaulle was also eager to carry out the operation.

•^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 477.

38Ibid.
■•^The British fleet that sailed on 3* August consisted of two battle
ships, Resolution and Barham, four cruisers, Devonshire, Australia, Cum
berland, and Oregon, one carrier, Ark Royal, several destroyers, one
tanker, and three transports. 'White, Seeds. p. 182.
^Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 483-484.
41

The defenses of Dakar included coastal batteries consisting of nine
240mm, three 155mm, and eight 380mm guns of the crippled battleship, Rich
elieu; naval forces consisting of two cruisers, two super destroyers, one
1800 ion destroyer, six armed sloops, two submarines, ten naval attack
planes, one.fighter group, one bomber group, and five regiments of troops.
Auphan, French Navy, p. 190.
Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 486.
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On the morning of 23 September force "M" approached Dakar through
a heavy fog and began initiating operation "Menace."

After the open land

ing phase of the operation failed and a tactless ultimatum was delivered
to Governor Boisson, the French coastal batteries opened up on the Bri
tish fleet.

An indecisive gunnery duel followed, ensued by an unsuccess

ful landing attempt by de Gaulle at Rufisque, some distance to the north.
Inconclusive fighting took place during the following two days until Ad
miral Cunningham withdrew because of damage caused to several of his ships
On 25 September Churchill sent a telegram to his commanders suggesting
breaking off the engagement.

They concurred and the battle of Dakar was

M l

ended.
The reasons for the failure of operation "Menace" were numerous.
First, of course, was the arrival of the French squadron to bolster the
defenses of Dakar.

The failure of the British to stop this force at Gib

raltar was attributed to a communications breakdown in the British Admi
ralty.

The British commander at Gibraltar, Admiral Sir Dudley North, had

not been informed of the Dakar mission so his message to the Admiralty
informing of the prospected passage of French ships was not marked "Im
portant "and was not deciphered for four days, on 14 September, three days
after the fact was known through other channels.

By the time the import

of the message had been discovered and the Gibraltar fleet had raised steam
to pursue-the French it was too late.

Churchill said "this chapter of

accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar.

^Auphan, French Navy, pp. 189-191.
44
, .
Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 491.
^ ^Ibid.. p. 492.

45

45

Due to misinformation and unguarded optimism, the British had under
estimated both the strength and determination of the Vichy forces at Dakar
to resist.

The fact that a majority- of the coastal artillery was manned

by French marines who had been at Mers-el-Kebir suggests the determination
of the defenders of Dakar to resist the British assault.

The military

garrison at Dakar, nearly twice as large as de Gaulle's intelligence re
ports had indicated was content to obey the orders of the existing Vichy
24.5
commanders and showed little desire to embrace de Gaulle.
Most impor
tant, however, was the attitude of Boisson.

He was loyal only to the

French empire and his beloved colonial service and could see no reason to
hand over his responsibility to de Gaulle.

He concluded that if he did,

Germany would have sufficient reason to intervene in Africa.

47

His deter

mination to resist was exemplified by his answer to de Gaulle's ultimatum
to surrender: "France has entrusted me with Dakar.
48
to the end."

I will defend Dakar

Churchill recognized these facts in his later statement

that the "arrival of reinforcements, good gunners and bitterminded Vichy
officials" ruined the whole scheme of a "bloodless landing and occupation
by General de Gaulle.

When it had become "obvious that Dakar would be

defended to the death," Churchill decided to push no more.
forget the incident and conceded the victoiy to Vichy. ^

Morton, "Movement," p. 4^9.
^White, Seeds, p. 197.
48
Auphan, French Navy, p. 190.
^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 482.

5°Ibid.. pp. 490-493.

He desired to

46

The reaction to ;the Dakar raid on Vichy was immediate.

In a meeting

of the "couseil restreint,? Darlan, described as being ‘’demented with rage,"
demanded retaliation.
Gibraltar.

51

Again he settled for a retaliatory bombing raid on

In a symbolic gesture to justify the symbolic air raid Bau

douin declared that France was “not so broken that she must endure this
from her former ally."

52

But the episode was not completely over.

From Dakar de Gaulle moved his small force south to Duala in the Cameroons where he was significantly more well received.

53

He shortly made

his way to Brazzaville in the Middle Congo where he set up a temporary
base of operations.

French Equatorial Africa was secured for Free France.

It was from Brazzaville that de Gaulle issued his declaration which officially completed his break with the Vichy government.

54

Gn 27 October he

established the "Council for the Defense of the Empire" to "assume the
55
burden of directing the French war effort." ^

De Gaulle also issued bit

ter denunciations of the Vichy regime and of Petain in which he "released"
56
all Frenchmen from their obligations to the "pseudo-government of Vichy."
These declarations, along with the incident at Dakar, were to exercise
immediate effects on Franco-British relations, the results of which were,
in the period under consideration, decisive.
By considering the Dakar raid and the issuance of the Brazzaville

^Cole, Laval, p. 124.
•^Hew York Times. 24 September, 1940.
^^White. Seeds.’ p. 191.
t

*^De Gaulle, Call: Doc., pp. 46-48.
•^Morton, "Movement," p. 445.
56De Gaulle, Call: Doc.. p. 59.

Declaration as components of one episode, this episode can then be termed
the turning point in Franco-British relations of 1$40.

The failure of Op

eration "Menace” and the sudden realization of de Gaulle's political ambi
tions caused London to reassess its stand toward Vichy.

By nearly precip

itating war with Vichy, the Dakar affair caused a psychological depression
in Britain and alarm in the Commonwealth.

67

De Gaulle’s Manifesto issued

without the prior knowledge or consent of London, created troublesome pol
itical questions and reactions.

Since de Gaulle was viewed by Churchill

only as a military' rallying point, his new quest for political power ex
ceeded Britain’s degree of intention to support him.

The British govern

ment, therefore, made it explicit that de Gaulle was to refrain from such
political activities if he wished to be guaranteed support.

London declared

that it didi.not recognize de Gaulle as the government of France and would
refuse to condone his views on that subject as stated in his Manifesto.

58

The affair was.not without its bright sides from the British point
of view.

The spread of Vichy-German influence in Africa had been curtailed,

not by the Dakar incident itself but by the secession of the other French
colonies to de Gaulle.

The solidification of a Gaullist colonial bloc in

French West and Equatorial Africa permitted the establishment of an open
air route to the Middle East from the supply lines in West Africa.

59

And

it changed the British attitude toward Vichy, which by its independent
defensive stand at Dakar showed that it was far from committed to any

^Cole, Laval, p. 124.
^Morton, "Movement,: pp. 4^6-44-7.
^%hite, Seeds, p. 200.
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kind of collaborative partnership with the Axis powers, at least in the
military sense
The positive results of the affair were much greater and more clearly
defined in Vichy.

Although Dakar was used, as was the attack at Mer-el-

Kebir, as an item of anti-British and pro-German collaborationist propa
ganda, the incident actually increased Vichy's independence from Germany.
The stubborn defense of Dakar had demonstrated once again to the Germans
Vichy's willingness and ability to defend its Empire from any aggression.
The German Armistice commission permitted reinforcement of France's colon
ial army and a revival of the French Air Force.^

Yves Bouthillier, Vichy

Finance Minister, claimed that "little by little after September the French
government felt the grip of the Germans slacken."

New attempts at and

avenues of Franco-German negotiations were being established at this time
further easing the pressure on occupied France.
In regard to relations with Great Britain, the manifestations were
less concrete but no less real. Britishrespect forVichy

wasgreatly

in

creased by the defense of Dakar, as wasthe morale of theFrench military.
In this sense, the battle contributed greatly to the temporary detente
that was soon to be established.

64

New hope of resistance was given the

^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 193.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 86-87.
^White, Seeds. p. 198.
^Paxton, Parades and Politics, p. 84.

m

‘ ^Jacques Mordal, "La Bataille navale de Dakar," Revue des Deux Monies;
i l (Sept. 15, 1955), pp. 321-323.
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petainist faction of the government.

65

Appearances are often as influential

as realities, and Vichy at least thought they they had gained British re
spect, a respect that was to be temporarily manifested in marked improve
ments in their mutual relations.^

While the initial reaction in Vichy

to Dakar had been "a new surge of hostility toward the British," the ep
isode "proved decisive in bringing about better relations between London
ifn
and Vichy."
The French victory at Dakar provided a new framework for
the negotiaions with the British that were to ensue.

Throughout the period following Dakar, unofficial dipolmatic contact
was maintained between Vichy and London.
strain between them was easing.

By the end of September the

Informal exchanges had been taking place

during September at Madrid between the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir
Samuel Hoare

68

and his French counterpart, Count Renom de la Baume.

69

Af

ter a brief deterioration immediately following Dakar negotiations between
the two were resumed and continue until the middle of November.

As Hoare

put it "Madrid became a clearing house for French information and Anglo-

'’
tanger, Gamble. p. 86.
^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 193.
^White, Seeds, p. 199.
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Sir Samuel Hoare served as a Conservative M.P. from I9I0 to 1944.
He was Foreign Secretary in 1935 until forced to resign over a secret agreement with Laval regarding Ethiopia. He served as Ambassador to Spain
From 1940 to 1944. Created First Viscount Templewood in 1944.

69

7M. de la Baume was a career diplomat in the French Foreign Service.
Served as Vichy Ambassador to Spain until he was removed for his British
leanings. Preoccupied with bettering Vichy-British relations.
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French discussions."

70

Cause for negotiation was given impetus by the re

ception in Madrid on 26 September of an ultimatum issued by Admiral Darlan
demanding British non-interferance in the breaking of the blockade and the
recapturing of dissident colonies.

Although Darlan had acted without author

ization and the ultimatum was officially withdrawn, the incident made the
British realize that some actions had to be taken to prevent the recurrence
71
of such threats and the possibility of their being implemented.'

London

at first was noncommittal, so much so that Hoare remarked: "I am being used
as the principal channel for communication with it (Vichy) and I own I am
completely baffled as to what London wants."

72

Vichy supplied the initiative.

On 1 October Hoare received a message from Baudouin stating that if
the British government did not wish to drive France completely into Germ
an hands she must allow for an easing of the blockade to allow needed sup
plies to reach France.

If these supplies were seized by the Germans

(Britain’s main worry), the French Foreign Minister stated, then "the
French Government would be transferred to Morocco and France would be
once again united with the United Kingdom against Germany."

73

Baudouin

stressed that he was issuing this communication to eradicate anti- Bri
tish feeling in France and to make it possible for France and Great Britain to continue together for the final.victory.

7k

The British government

^^Viscount Templewood, Ambassador on a Special Mission. (London: Collins,
P*
Hereafter cited as Templewood. Mission.
^Bytier, F.F.P., pp. 9^-95.
72

1 / Templewood, Mission, p. 86.
73
f>Scbmitt, Accords. p. 39.
^ D e Gaulle, Call: Doc., p. *K).
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replied that, if it was understood by Vichy that it (Great Britain) would
retaliate against any further attacks.like the air raid on Gibraltar and
that it could not withdraw its support from de Gaulle, then it was prepared to enter discussions.

75

These discussions would then turn on three

points: the necessity to retain control of the Gaullist colonies to keep
them from falling into German hands; the possibility of resuming trade ex
changes between unoccupied France and her colonies; and the necessity of
76
keeping the French fleet out of Axis hands,

Britain would only enter

into negotiations on theses points if it was certain that France was act
ing independently of Germany and would show a more cooperative attitude
77
toward Britain.'

The Vichy government replied to these proposals stat

ing that, while it welcomed the British overtures, it could not undertake
negotiations on the conditions set forth.

It did, however, assure the

British govemraent that steps were being taken to secure the fleet and
that the Vichy government sincerely desired the setting up of some kind
9o

of trade modus vivendl with Britain.

Hoare was instructed to reply

orally to this in a negative manner but to convey to the French ambass
ador that the British government was still willing to begin discussions
79
immediately in Madrid and to "examine any concrete French proposals."
Nothing definite emerged from this exchange of proposals, due mainly to

?^De Gaulle, Call: Doc., p. 41.
"^Schmitt, Accords. p. 40
^ D e Gaulle, Call: Doc.. p. 41.
' 78Ibid.. pp. 43-44.
79
'Templewood, Mission, p 89.
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the growing internal strife at Vichy.
If negotiaions had been left up to de la Baume, a working arrange
ment between France and Great Britain could have been reached.

But the

power struggle at Vichy prevented him from obtaining any clear answers
to the various proposals.

80

On 28 October Laval replaced Baudouin as

Foreign Minister, thus diminishing any chance of success for the Madrid
negotiations.

Since Laval was striving for closer agreements with Germ

any he did not want to compromise his position by conducting relations
with Britain.

In any case he remained

fundamentally opposed to any of-

81
ficial or unofficial agreement with the British.”

Shortly after Laval’s

accession as Foreign Minister, de la Baume was transferred from Madrid to
a minor post in Bern.

His replacement, Pietri, was more disposed to fol

low Laval’s German oriented policy.

The chance for the formation of pro-

fitable relations left Madrid with de la Baume.
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The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax,8-^ was greatly disappointed
but renewed his intentions to establish some working relationship with
Vichy.

He became more willing to accept verbal promises from Vichy about

the disposition of the French fleet and the Empire.

Recognizing the firm

ally he had in de la Baume, Halifax proposed sending an unofficial mission

80

Templewood, Mission, p. 87.

81Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 99.
Qo
Templewood, Mission, p. 90.
8W
Halifax (Edward Wood) served as Conservative M.P. 1910-1925.
As Lord Irwin, served as Governor General of India 1926-31. Became leader
of House of Lords in 1935 and was appointed Foreign Secretary in 1938 and
supported appeasement policy. Served as Ambassador to the United States

19^0-19^6.
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to Bern to continue negotiations with the former Ambassador.
not agree to any such contact being renewed.

Laval would

Halifax made clear his de

termination to continue working for an agreement with Vichy government in
84
his statement: 'We have not desired to b u m our boats with/Vichy."
While discussions were still in progress Vichy provided another diplomatic initiative,/ the mission of Professor Louis Rougier.

The mission

was totally conceived and enacted by Rougier and was in no way official.
Early in September Rougier sent a telegram to an acquaintance in London,
Professor Lionel Robbins, a professor of economics and an advisor in the
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

In this telegram Rougier requested that

Robbins use his influence to have the blockade lifted.

Robbins replied

by inviting Rougier to come to London and present his own case to the
government.

86

/

Rougier proposed the idea to Petain of holding informal

discussions with the British in the hopes of clearing up some of the proOiy
blems associated with the blockade and the status of the French Navy.
Petain, endorsed the plan,saying: "So you want to go to London, what a
good idea!

Do tell the British that I bear them no grudge."

88 Petain

could have had several reasons for allowing Rougier to go to London.

He

may have wanted to use the mission as a counter-balance to Laval's

^ v t i e r . F.F.P..' pp. 93-99.
8^Louis Rougier was a Professor of Political Philosophy and Economics
at the University of Besancon. Served basically as a messenger from Vichy
to London, Madrid, and Algiers. He was very impressed with his own importance.
86$rtier, F.F.P., p. 100.
^Garcon. P.M. II. p. 679.
88Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 100.

5*
collaborative intentions or, more probably, to try to ease the economic
difficulties brought on by the British blockade.
sion was kept from Laval.
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All news of the mis-

The Marshal’s intentions were and are a

source of great controversy but, in any case, Rougier did go to London,
91
although he was entrusted with no official powers of negotiation.
Upon arriving in London on 22 October, Rougier met with both Hal
ifax and Churchill.

The results of these meetings were set down in an

informal "Gentleman's Agreement."

There were two interpretations of this

agreement, Rougier's and the British government's,

Rougier contended that

he and Churchill had agreed to a protocol which included provisions that:
1)Britain would restore the integrity of the French empire after the war
if France did not aid the Axis; 2)Britain would authorize the transport
of colonial produce to France; 3)Britain would make no further incursions
into the French empire; 4)Britain would force de Gaulle to make no more
radio attacks on Petain; 5)France would not try to recapture the Gaullist
colonies; 6)France would cede no bases to the Axis; 7)France would re
enter the war when Britain could supply enough troops; and 8)France would
scuttle the fleet rather than let it fall into Axis hands.

92

Added to

Rougier's version in the British version was the point that Britain re
served the right to support the Gaullist colonies.

Omitted were the pro

visions to raise the blockade, cease the radio attacks, and restore the

89
*
Jean Fernet, "Deposition of Admiral Fernet in the Petain Trial: The
Rougier Mission," in Hoover Institute. F.D.G.O.. Vol. II, p. 933. Here
after cited as Fernet, "Deposition."
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 100.
gi
Cole, Laval, p. 121.
^Aron, Vichy Regime, pp. 221-222.
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the integrity of the French empire at the conclusion of the war.

The

British emphasized that the agreement was not an official protocol but
merely a statement of conditions which might constitute a preliminary
arrangement for a Franco-British modus vivendi.

98

Whether or not an official agreement was ratified is a difficult
question to answer.

A letter from Petain to Halifax in December assuring

the British government that France would conclude no separate peace or
cede any bases to the Axis seems to suggest that the "Gentleman's Agree
ment" had not been ratified.

If it had then the British would have alQtj,

ready had the Marshal’s assurances and would have required no more.
Again, however, the appearance of an agreement based on Rougier's inter
ne
pretation was sufficient to convince Vichy that one did, in fact, exist.
At the very least, from the Vichy point of view, the interviews Rougier
96
had with British leaders "justified great hopes."7

On 21 November the

British Consul General in Geneva received a telegram from the British
government confirming, in principle, the British interpretation of the
"conversation" held with Rougier.

97

Whether thay had ratified the agree-

ment or not the British government respected its terms.
between Vichy and London did improve.

98

Relations

Some food shipments from North

^Fernet, "Deposition," p. 93^.
9h
1
Schmitt, Accords. pp. 93-9^.

97
7fAron, Vichy Regime, p. 222.

30l.

^Georges Bonnet, Q.uai d'Orsay (Isle of Man: Times Press, 1965), p.
Hereafter cited as Bonnet, Q.uai d'Orsav.
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Africa -were allowed to pass to France and there were no further attacks
on French colonies.

99

This -unofficial rapprochement was, however, in

serious jeopardy from its inception, for Laval was using his newly ac
quired office as foreign minister to increase his personal power and
further his goal of collaboration with Germany at the expense of the
Anglo-French detente.

99
_
^ Langer, Gamble. p. 89.

CHAPTER IV
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF LAVAL: 28 OCTOBER-13 DECEMBER 194-0

On 28 October Pierre Laval was named foreign minister, ostensibly
as a reward for his part in the discussions at Montoire between himself,
Petain, and Hitler on 22-24- October.

Laval met Hitler on 22 October as

the Fxlhrer was enroute to a meeting with Franco.
over by the Nazi leader.*

He was immediately won

Laval wasted little time in informing Hitler

of his policy goals and stated that he "regarded collaboration as the
only possible policy defeated France could take toward Germany."

2

His

attitudes toward the British were again pronounced: "As a Frenchman, I
a
can only say that I desire with all uy heart a British defeat."-^

Hitler

appeared well-disposed to such proclamations, although time was to prove
that seeking positive results or granting concessions were not parts of
that disposition.

As Laval testified at Petainfs trial, there had been

nothing definite decided at Montoire and the discussions only served to
L
confirm the modus vivendi of the Armistice.
At that time, however,
Laval saw the talks as a clear vindication of his policies, the pursuit
of which would lead to great personal accomplishments in the field of

Aron, Vichy Regime, p. 216.
^Langer, Gamble. p. 90.
3
<Aron, Vichv Regime, p. 215.
Bonnet, Q.uai d ’Orsav. p. 302.
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Franco-German relations.^
Two days later, on 2b October, 'Petain met with Hitler, now returning
from his exasperating session with Franco.

The main areas *dth which

Petain hoped the meeting would deal were P.O.W.'s, occupation costs, De
marcation Line abuses, and economic problems, especially those dealing
with the acquisition of food supplies for France.^

He also wished to
7

clarify or renegotiate any points raised in Hitler's meeting with Laval.'
The reason for this latter desire was that the Marshal was less convinced
than Laval about the overriding necessity of collaboration with Germany
to the exclusion of relations with Britain.

This view was shortly there

after expressed in a letter from Petain to Weygand in which the Marshal
stressed the need for maintaining a "prudent equilibrium" between the two
g
areas of policy.
Petain accepted, at Montoire, the principle of collaboration but not
any specifics.

As he said in a radio broadcast on 30 October:

Collaboration has been envisaged between our two
countries. I have accepted the principleQof it. The
conditions of it will be discussed later.
Later he told H. Freeman Matthews, the United States1 charge at Vichy,
that the kind of collaboration he foresaw was "only economic collaboration
and in no sense military aid to Germany in her war against Britain, nor
cession of b a s e s . I n

any event, claimed Petain, collaboration would

^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 165.’
^Ibid.. p. 16b.

7
'Warner, Laval, p. 235.

8Schmitt, Accords, p. 80.
^rtier, F.F.P.. p. 16b.
10
hanger, Gamble, p. 101.
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not effect the sovereignty of France, which obliged and compelled her to
defend the empire against any aggression, German or British.

11

The Mar

shal's inability to convey these feelings to the French nation as a whole,
or to the British and Americans, caused in a large part the "Appalling
crisis of conscience that Vichy imposes on public opinion."

12

It also

served to confuse the relations of Vichy with both Germany and Great Bri
tain.
Manifestations of the new spirit of Franco-German collaboration were
not long in coming.

They were decidedly one-sided in Germany's favor.

To obtain the confidence of the Germans and to show his good will, Laval
made many economic concessions.

The most important and damaging of these

were the cession of the French owned Bor copper mines in Yugoslavia to
Germany and the forced return of the Belgian gold reserves, entrusted to
the Banque de France since the outbreak of the war and then transferred
to Dakar for safe keeping.

Returning the gold to the Belgian government

in Belgium was tantamount to handing it over to the Reichsbank since the
Germans would and did have no trouble seizing the gold after the transfer.
Thsi latter concession of Laval was, as Haider said, "nothing but a legal
14
form of extortion."
Also accepted by French collaborationists, Laval, Darlan, de Brinon,
and Huntziger, now Secretary of State for War, was a plan to invade and
recapture' the West African colony of Chad from de Gaulle's Free French

^Sjamer, Laval, p. 240.

12

Aron, Vichv Regime, p. 225.

^Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 168-1 ?1.

14

Haider, Journal. V, p. 43.

13

6o
forces.

This agreement was based on a German threat to step in unless
1<
the French reasserted their control over the colonies.
Events occurring
between the planning and execution stages of the operation were, however,
to prevent it from being implemented.
The French received nothing in return for these coneessions.

The De

marcation Line remained as difficult to cross, the Wiesbaden negotiations
remained as useless, the French government was not allowed to return to
Paris, the occupation costs were not reduced, and most insulting and de
moralizing of all, a new wave of expulsions from Lorraine was begun.
These situations appeared to all but the most ardent collaborationists as
a manifesto of German intentions, little moderated by Montoire, and as a
direct negative reply to Laval’s intentions of good-will and collaboration.

Also occurring during Laval’s reign as foreign minister, although un
beknown to and in spite of him, was a secret agreement between Petain and
the British regarding the blockade.

The agents for this agreement were

Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretaiy, and an old personal friend
of his, Jacques Chevalier, the Vichy Secretaiy General of Public Instruction.

17

The initiative came from the British who, learning of the Mon

toire meetings and fearing the consequences of closer Franco-German col
laboration, became greatly alarmed.

They consequently determined to es

tablish more amicable relations with Vichy, if for no other reason than
to offset any possible collaborative agreements that may have been made

.

*%alder, Journal. V, p. k3.

l7Ibid.. p. 1(&

at Montoire.

Not being prescient and thus not knowing that the Montoire

meetings had been devoid of practical importance, the British felt it nec
essary to try to negate or neutralize any new: pro-German feelings in
... . 18
Vichy.
Halifax therefore undertook to contact Chevalier and make proposals
for the basis of an agreement.

On h December Chevalier received Pierre

Dupuis, the Canadian charge, who was bearing a personal message from Hal
ifax.

The message, as read to Chevalier by Dupuis, stated:
Lord Halifax desires to re-establish contact through you
as an intermediary. It is to yougpersonally that he turns
and it is on you that he relies.

Dupuis then proceeded to give the. text of Halifax* message:
Please tell our French friends that we are in an extremely
delicate situation. We cannot leap into each others arms.
A state of artificial tension must be maintained between
our French friends and cursives. But behind this front of
disagreement we must agree.
He then stated that all the British wished was that the French cede no
air or naval bases to the Germans.

Formally, the British asked that the

French: protect their fleet, protect their colonies, and make no attempt
to regain control of the Gaullist colonies.

If the French met these con

ditions the British were prepared to ease the blockade to allow food sup
plies and essential products, namely wheat, peanuts, and sheep in the first
category, and petroleum products in the second, to reach France, provided
that they not pass through or into German hands.

Most of all, concluded

Dupuis, any agreement must be made and kept in absolute silence and secrecy,

t 18Eytier, F.F.P.. pp. 96-97.

19

Jacques Chevalier, "Deposition of M. Chevalier in the Petain Trial"
in Hoover Institute, F.D.C-.O.. Vol. II, p. 936. Hereafter cited as Chev
alier, "Deposition."

20.
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for if the Germans learned of the Franco-British intimacy they would
most certainly invoke Article IX of the Armistice allowing them to inter
vene in North Africa if the strictest terms of the Armistice were not met.
At that time Britain was not prepared to reply to such intervention.
On the following day Chevalier communicated the suggestions to the
Marshal who, though desiring more specific information on those points
dealing with the colonies, approved the plan.

His only reservation was

that the massage should be changed to read "a state of artificial coldness"
instead of "a state of artificial tension" existed between Britain and
France.

He then told Chevalier: "No one is more ready than I am to agree

to the English demands..."

21

Later on the same day, 5 December, Chevalier

and Dupuis met and drafted the agreement in the form agreed on by Petain.
On the morning of 6 December, this final draft was submitted to the
Marshal, who agreed on all points.

On the following day Dupuis departed

for London and en the evening of 9 December sent a coded message to Chev
alier stating "All goes well," indicating, as through their prior understanding, that the British government accepted the agreement.

22

The final

terms of the agreement were that: a state of "artificial coldness" rather
than a state of "artificial tension" existed between and would be main
tained by London and Vichy; a status quo in the colonies- would be respected
with the provision that at some later date the dissident colonies would
revert to the French empire; Petain and Vichy would at no time surrender
either the fleet or colonies to the Axis; the British would refrain from
making radio broadcasts interfering with the internal affairs of France;

?1
Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 936.
22Ibid.. p. 937.
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the British would consider food shipments from the French colonies to
metropolitan France as coastal shipping, and other matters concerning
the blockade would be discussed later by specialists in Madrid; and
French troops in the French empire would protect the territory from all
attacks, from wherever they might originate.

23

As in the Rougier affair, much controversy has arisen as to whether
the agreement was actually and officially confirmed and ratified by both
parties.

One thing the Halifax-Chevalier compact did prove was that, -since

this latter agreement dealt with basically the same points as the Rougier
"Gentleman's Agreement," this latter agreement had not been confirmed by
the parties involved.

It was, more likely, the official culmination of

the unofficial Rougier negotiations.

oh.

In all probability, however, due

to the pressing need for secrecy, the Halifax-Chevalier accord was not
officially confirmed or ratified.

As Chevalier stated, however, it "came

into effect immediately, as all the services having to do with the matter
can testify."

Maritime traffic was re-established on a large scale from

colonial to metropolitan France.

The straits of Gibraltar was made free

for passage by French ships, those carrying personnel and equipment to
Dakar, those with English permits, or "navicerts," carrying fuel and diesel
oil to and from North Africa, and those carrying essential food supplies.
According to Admiral Marquis, engaged in bringing supplies to France and

^Schmitt, Accords. pp. 103-104.
Oh
Ibid^. p. 99.
. ^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 937.
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ignorant of the agreement:
...everything went off as if there were a sort of tacit
accord on the sea between the French and English, since
our convoys were going through Gibraltar...British patrolboats continued to signal 'bon voyage1 and to make
gestures of politeness.
From the late autumn of 1940 to the autumn of 1942, 2000 French ships
in 600 convoys passed Gibraltar w i t h o u t interference.

On shipping lanes

not included in the agreement, forty per cent of French tonnage x-ras cap-

2g
tured.

Chevalier declared, in a general sense, that "the agreement was

carried out for the greatest good...both of France and of England."2^ It
was good for France because it made it possible to avoid starvation and
the paralysis of industry by permitting foodstuffs and petroleum products
to pass through the blockade.

30

It was good for England because of the

solemn promise of Petain to protect the fleet,

31

and, because of the sec

recy with which the agreement was made and kept, the Germans were not given
a pretext for intervening in North Africa.

The British determination to

maintain the agreement was made evident by their frequent dispatches,
through American diplomatic agents and Dupuis, exhorting the French to
continue their resistance to German demands.

Temporarily, at least, ac

cording to Chevalier, Franco-British relations continued in the most cordial

27«ytier, F.F.P.. p. 107.
28Ibid.
2^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 937.
3°Ibid.
31

This promise was kept on 27 November, 1942 when the French fleet
was scuttled to prevent it from falling into the hands of the oncoming
Germans. Ibid.

manner."

32

The beginning of I9W

of a- detente in London and Vichy.

saw all the signs of the recognition
33

As stated above, these negotiations -were kept secret from Laval.
There is little doubt that, given his intense desire for collaboration
■with Germany and his hatred of the British, he would have tried, had he
learned of the Dupuis mission, to scuttle the negotiations at their incep
tion.

As it turned out, however, the reverse proved to be the immediate

case.

The success of the negotiations and the beneficial results of the

implementation of the agreement provided great impetus to and incentive
for the anti-Laval faction of the Vichy government.

•^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 938.
^Cobban, "Vichy," p. 381.

CHAPTER V
THE FALL OF LAVAL: 13 DECEMBER, 1^0-6 FEBRUARY, 1 ^ 1

At a meeting of the full cabinet at eight o ’clock on the evening of
13 December Petain asked for the resignations of every member of the cab
inet.

Only two, those of M. Ripert and Pierre Laval were accepted.

The

dismissal of Ripert was inconsequential, that of Laval was not, for it
provoked a two month crisis that revealed "the fundamental attitudes of
the Petain government toward problems of foreign policy."*

The reasons

for this seemingly sudden upheaval in the Vichy power structure were num
erous and complex.

The most obvious cause was the personal dislike of

Petain for Laval and his methods of work.

Their relationship had been

only a business alliance from the beginning since Petain needed Laval's
political abilities and Laval, in turn, needed the path to power provided
toy the Marshal.

The two were, however, "fundamentally incompatible."

2

There was also the matter of the personal animosities, jealousies,
and ambitions of the other cabinet members, especially Baudouin and Darlan.
Also used by the anti-collaboration faction to discredit Laval in the
3

Marshal's eyes was his (Laval's) part in promoting the Chad affair.
These reasons were only superficial and secondary.

*Hvtier. F.F.P.. p. 222.
^Warner, Laval, p. 258.
\ron, Vichy, p. 232.
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The basic cause was,

instead, the failure of Laval’s policy of collaboration, especially after
supposedly taking new meaning and direction from the Montoire meetings.
Laval’s failure to obtain tangible results from the "understanding” reached
at Montoire was exacerbated by his part on the Belgian gold and the Bor
mines surrenders.

The expulsions of the Lorrainers was the final humili

ation brought about by Laval in the "new spirit" of Montoire.

As P/tain

told Baudouin on 8 December: "I am sick and tired of Pierre Laval^s policy
...Montoire is a failure which we cannot conceal.”

As General Huntziger

told the head of the German military administration, General Steulpnagel
who, in turn, reported to Berlin:
one of the reasons for Laval’s downfall was the fact
that as a result of our own (German) vacillating at- ?
titude Laval was unable to show any tangible results.
As the hope that Laval might wring some concessions from the Germans
faded so did Laval's prestige and power at and usefulness to Vichy.

The dismissal of Laval was not a matter undertaken unhesitatingly by
Petain, for the possibility of German reprisals had to be considered.

The

only way to prevent a dangerously adverse German reaction was to replace
Laval with(a Foreign Minister acceptable to the Germans. He also had to
be acceptable to Petain, the French people, and the British.

The only

candidate who met all the requirements was Pierre-Etienne Flandin.^

He

was a political rightist and had supported the "national revolution" of

^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 22?.
^Haider, Journal. V, p. ?2.

Party.

Pierre-Etienne Flandin was a leader of the French Left Republican
He was Premier of France from 193^ to 1935.
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10 July.

He had been a strong advocate of a Franco-British alliance

prior to the outbreak of war and had gained a reputation as an Anglophile.
He became an appeaser after Munich and became known as the man who had
sent a telegram of congratulation to Hitler after the Munich conference.
He had opposed the war in 1939 but voted for all military appropriations
necessary to prosecute the war once it was declared.

After the Armistice

he had advocated a limited form of collaboration with Germany.

He had

had some contact with Abetz in Paris during the Summer of 1940 and was'
Q
well thought of by the German Ambassador.
He was, more importantly,
O
acceptable to Berlin.

The "conspirators" in Laval’s dismissal awaited the German reaction
in a state of "anxious confusion. "*^

They planned nothing past the actual

dismissal and their future depended, to a great degree, on how much imp
ortance the Germans had placed on Laval as a channel for negotiations.
Preliminary reactions began filtering in to Vichy by 14- December.

Darlan

and General Laure, a personal friend and confidant of Petain!s, went to
Paris on that day and met with an incensed Abetz.

The German Ambassador,

who had placed so much faith in negotiations with Laval, attacked the "con
spirators, " especially Weygand who, he claimed, had engineered Laval"s
overthrow.**

On 16 December Abetz, accompanied by well-armed S.S. guards,

7Efertier, F.F.P., pp. 229-231.
^.S. Dept. of State, D^G^P.P.. X, p. 581.
o
^Haider, Journal. V, p. 70.

*Vtier, JUFJP., p. 233.
**Halder, Journal. V, p. 84.
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went to Vichy to protest the dismissal and to demand Laval’s immediate
re-instatement.

The next day Abetz met with Petain and Darlan.

The

meeting was interrupted by Laval who burst in and showered a stream of
violent abuse on the Marshal.

12

Abetz was shocked by this lack of res

pect and began to understand Petain’s motives for dismissing Laval.

After

this episode Abetz was more tailing to accept compromises, such as the
formation of a "directorate," although he still wished Laval to be ineluded in any government.

13

A "directorate" consisting of Darlan, Flandin, and Huntziger was
formed shortly thereafter.
to the return of Laval.

Flandin, however, remained adamantly opposed

He was, however, becoming more willing to make

verbal concessions to the Germans on other points.Flandin insisted
Laval's absence need have no bearing onFranco-Germanrelations

that

andstated

on 2k December that the new French government "never had envisaged a mod
ification of the policy which it is pursuing with foreign powers and
notably with Germany."

IL

The matter had evolved, in Flandin's mind, into

a question of the independence and sovereignty of the French government.
To give in to demands to bring Laval back would be to surrender these al
ready precarious vestiges of the Third. Republic and to become further in
dentured to Germany.
Germanyls initial responses were to close the Demarcation Line again
to North-South traffic and further to restrict the Scapini mission.

l2Garcon, P.M.. I, p. 552.
, l3Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 235-236.
U Ibid.. p. 238.
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Laval' importance to Hitler, or rather the lack of it, was illustrated.
by Mussolini who, having called Berlin to find out about the French crisis, stated: "the Germans don't seem too concerned about it."

16

Ribben-

trop, demonstrating his contempt of and indifference to Laval, told Ciano
that he had planned to use a proposed meeting with him (Laval) to "water
down his wine."

17

While not caring a great deal about Laval personally,

the Germans used his dismissal as a pretext to refuse future concessions.

18

As Hitler said in a staff conference on 8-9 January: "We are no longer
io
bound by any obligations toward France." 7 Claiming that the Laval crisis
had destroyed all hope of collaboration, the O.K.W. directed the Armistice
Commission to use the terms of the Armistice as the sole foundation for
relations with France until such time as Vichy provided the initiative to
re-establish more congenial ties.

20

Hitler did, however, view the crisis

as being serious enough to order the preparations for the occupation of
all of France.

21

The threat of a military revolt in the occupied zone was

also perceived and the tanks in Paris were ordered to make "ready for ac
tion. "22
Concerning the return of Laval to the French'government, Hitler was

*^Ciano, Diaries, p. 323.

17

Ciano, Dio. Papers, p. *K)7.

18Garcon, P.M.. II, pp. 1098-1102.
*%alder, Journal. V. p.
2GU.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. XII, pp. 98-99.
2i
Ulrich von Hassell, Diaries (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 19^7),

.

p. 162

22Halder . Journal. V. p. 7*K

^

7i
in no hurry.

Abets was instructed to prevent Laval from returning to the

unoccupied zone and to prevent him from reaching any agreement with the
leaders of the Vichy government.

23

Hitler wanted to keep Laval in reserve

as a threat to Petain and to form a future French government in case "Wey2Mgand goes over toothe British and de Gaulle. •'
Laval did manage to meet
with Petain and Darlan, the latter of whom was now making his move for
power and who offered Laval a thechic al ministry in his new government in
reward for his backing.

Encouraged by Darlan and Abetz, the opinion that

the Germans would not talk to Flandin was growing at Vichy.

It soon be

came apparent, due to this opinion and Flandin!s poor health, that he had
to be replaced.

In early February Darlan became Vice-Premier.

episode had simply paved the way for his takeover.
missal of Laval changed nothing.

The whole

Like Montoire, the dis

The policy of collaboration was merely

to be pursued and implemented by a different man, Darlan.

23Eytier, F.F.P.. p. 2k6.
2^Halder, Journal. V, p. 98,
25Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 222, 2^-246.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The nine month period of Vichy’s foreign policy, June, i9^0-February,

19W , witnessed a broad spectrum of dipolmatic, political, and military
activity.

Its relations with Germany and Great Britain, although seemingly

chaotic and contradictory, had certain constant themes, attitudes and goals.
Both Germany and Great Britain had specific policy aims regarding France,
which in turn had specific counter-aims.

Germany wanted to "exploit the

economic potential (of France) in the service of the German war economy,"*
and to "get out of France, through siezure or purchase at infinitesimal
prices the materials of use for the German armament."

2

Great Britain

wanted to keep the French navy and Empire from falling control of the Ax
is, either by having them join the British and continue the fighting or
by rendering them harmless.

All the policies of these two nations were

directed toward obtaining these ends.

Vichy France, militarily defeated,

morally, physically, and economically exhausted, and politically unstable
was forced into the nearly impossible task of reconstmxcting its own soc
iety while at the same time dealing with the demands of its conqueror and
its.former ally.

V.G.F.P.. X, p. 129.

2Potts, Armistice, p. 5^.
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The monumental task of rebuilding French society took immediate prior
ity.

The Vichy government was faced with the problems resulting from the

disrupted economy and the contigent problem of unemployment, the numerous
French, Belgian, and German refugees who had flooded into the unoccupied
zone, the physical destruction caused by the fighting, and the moral and
psychological degeneration caused by the disastrous defeat.

To reach sol

utions to these problems the Vichy government had to seek the aid and ap
proval of the German occupation administration which to a great degree
controlled the economic and human resources of France.

The main channels

through which negotiation on these points' could be undertaken were the
"official" one of the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden and the
"unofficial" one of the German "Ambassador" in Paris, Otto Abetz.
The only other attempt at negotiations made outside these channels
during this period was the abortive Montoire conference.

This meeting

was one of the very few instances in which Petain engaged in direct talks
with the Germans.

For the most part direct negotiations were carried on

by his subordinates Laval, Huntziger and Barlan.

Flandin, during his

brief term of office, did not meet with German agents except for a few
brief talks with Abetz after the dismissal of Laval.

All of these "dip

lomats" favored some form or working with, or collaborating with the Ger
mans to attempt to solve the problems of France.

There were, in fact,

very few officials of the Vichy regime, most notably Weygand, who did
not-logically favor some form of collaboration with Germany.

This was,

indeed, the only method by which solutions to the critical problems could
be reached.

There were, however, different ideas as to the extent and

form of this collaboration, 'and it was this difference of opinion that
led to Laval’s dismissal in December, 19^0.

The terra ncollaboration" implied a relationship of at least partial
reciprocity of action.

In the particular case of Franco-German relation

however, this reciprocity did not apply equally to both parties.

Germany

was in a position to dominate the relationship, either by reward or by re
tribution.

The Vichy government had few means of pressure at hand to use

in negotiating with the Germans.

It did, however, maintain control of the

fleet and the empire and what minor successes the French did have can be
attributed to German desires to avoid any action drastic enough to drive
the fleet and empire into the British camp.

The Germans1 main goal con

cerning the empire was to "...secure the French colonial empire against
an Anglo-American attact and against de Gaulle, and to exploit the Franco-

3
African area and its bases for German naval, air, and military forces."
The importance of and respect for the fleet was illustrated throughout
the summer of 19^ 0.
The events of the period, the attack at Mers-el-Kebir, the defection
of French West and Equatorial African colonies to the de Gaulle movement,
and the Dakar raid showed that French loyalty to Vichy and the Armistice
was not unconditional and could be withdrawn if France were treated too
harshly by the Germans.

The conciliatory attitude of the Germans changed

later in the period as shown by Hitler"s statement of 9 January, 19W-:
"If France becomes troublesome she will have to be crushed completely."^
Even then Hitler stressed his regard for the fleet: "Under no circumstance

^O.K.K.. Fuhrer Conf.. I, p. 35.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 146,
'b.K.K.. Fuhrer Conf.. I (I9W ) , p. 3.
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must the French fleet be allowed to get away from us; it must be either
captured or d e s t r o y e d . O n c e this attitude came to predominance in Berin, Vichy France had little to entice Germany into active collaboration.
To the Germans collaboration came to be compared to a "waggon f~sic~~) driver
r>
who whips his mules crying 'collaboration, collaboration.'"' It came to
be used by the Germans as a lever to obtain what they wanted by appearing,
through the definition of the term, to reciprocate.

It was, in this appli-

cation, also used to minimize and nuetralize French protests.

8

The greatest obstacle to the success of collaboration as a policy in
addition to the previously stated shortcomings of the Vichy system, was
Hitler's overriding hatred and contempt of France.

As he stated in Mein

Kamgf: "The German people's irreconcilable mortal enemy is and remains
o
France."
Political necessity forced him to moderate M s outward attitudes
during the TMrties.

All the wMle, however, he was planning for a war

with France and England,

10 Germany's "two hateful enemies." 11 Once the

war with France was won Hitler was again obliged to be more conciliatory
toward France than he might otherwise have been because of the presence
and power of the French fleet and empire.

He never lost M s hatred for

the French nor M s desire to crush and humiliate them as witnessed by

6 O.K.K., Fuhrer Conf.. I (1940), p. 3.
^Ciano, Diaries. p. 560.
V t i e r , F.F.P., p. 175.
^Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. p. 902.
^International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals.
42 Vol., (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), pp. 381-391.
11U.S. State Dept. D.G.F.P.. X, p. 129.
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Goebbels statement of 30 April, 19^2: nIf the French knew what the Fuhrer
is one day going to demand of them their eyes in all liklihood would brim
over,"

12

Collaboration, especially the kind envisioned by Laval after

Kontoire, was destined to fail, of for no other reason than Hitler’s per
sonal feelings and attitudes.
The chaotic appearance and, to some degree, reality of the Vichy gov
ernment and its foreign policy was due in part to the frequent changes in
high-level personnel.

The foreign relations were directed, at various and

in certain cases coincident times by Baudouin, Laval, Flandin, and Darlan.
There were also several unofficial agents such as Rougier, de la Baurne,
Chevalier, and de Brinon carrying on diplomatic relations with Germany or
Great Britain.

The one unifying and catalytic factor was Marshal Petain.

Except for the case of Laval, all these agents were responsible directly
to Pdtain who knowingly approved their activities,

Laval, the exception,

was dismissed in part for his failure to keep the Marshal informed of his
actions.

Through Petain, then, the foreign policy of France remained as

constant as the drastic circumstances would permit.
The Marshal frequently'- and bitterly has been criticized for his seem
ingly inconsistent, contradictory, and insincere foreign policy.

This is

not fully the case, for he had certain ideas and motives that guided his
policy and to which he generally adhered.

He has been accused of playing

a double game , or "double jeu," in his relations with Germany and Great
Britain, and this is partially true. Circumstances would not allow him
to do otherwise. His relations with Germany and Great Britain were sincere.

*^Louis P. Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries. (Washingtion D.C.:
The Infantry Journal Press, 19^8), p. 198.
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He did not seek to play them off against each other and dealt with each,
in turn, honestly and directly.

One example of this occurred in connection

with the Kontoire talks and the Rougier mission.

Rougier had left for Lon

don prior to and was engaged in talks there at the time Petain met with
Hitler.

At Montoire the Marshal, in effect, forgot about Rougier and dir-

ected himself totally to the discussions at hand with Hitler.

13

It would

have been easy and perhaps beneficial for him to use either discussion as
a lever in the other but he did not.
Petain expressed his feelings and attitudes to Chevalier on 1 Febru
ary, 1$W, and his statements well illustrated his position regarding the
supposed "double jeu:"
I do not play a double game. I do not play a double
game...! have but one. promise to give, and I keep it. I
^
am Honorable in rry dealings with one side as with the other.
The Marshal explained the reasons he had to deal with both Germany and
Great Britain and stated his preferences:
I am caught between two policies. One is, that of col
laboration with the English, a policy to which all ny
preferences go. The other is the rule of the conqueror
to which I am forced to submit because the conqueror is
here and because he imposes his ruie on the people whom
I must defend against him. *
He then stated why he had to be honest with the Germans:
With those on one side I signed the Armistice, and I
respect the terras of the Armistice. And I do so on
the expressed and formal desire of the English, who

^^Schmitt, Accords. p. 82.
^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 939.

*^Ibid.

say that a rupture of.the Armistice would result in a
German intervention. °
About his relations with the British Petain claimed:
On the other hand, I am true to the English and friendly
toward them because within the limits of the field which remains
open to me, and it is not a very large field, I do everything
in my power to facilitate their task and to prepare their vic
tory, which will be our victory as well. But at the same tiros,
I resist to the greatest possible extent the demands of the
Germans. '
Chevalier then gives an example of the Marshal's stated determination to
resist major German demands.
In April, 1 9 W , the Germans were trying doggedly to incorporate Al
sace into the Reich.

Petain was just as vehemently opposed.

Chevalier,

as Minister of Public Instruction, had occasion to discuss the matter vdth
a German art historian reputed to be in Hitler's confidence, Herr Herckmans.
Herckmans reiterated Germany's demand for Alsace to which Chevalier re
plied "nothing of that kind can be done.
movable on the question of Alsace."

18

The Kardchal is absolutely im-

Herckmans than proposed compromises

but stated that there would have to be one agreed precondition:
The Mar^chal would have to stop blocking all our de
mands by complete refusals and would have to: support
the policy of collaboration, whereas at present he
always shows himself to be against it. °
✓
Herckmans went on to tell Chevalier that in Berlin, Petain was known as
"Marechal Nein-because he always says no.

^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 939.
l7Ibid.
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These were Petain*s guiding beliefs.

Other factors did, however,

enter into the formulation of the policy of Vichy.

During the beginning

of the period covered the outcome of the war was still much in doubt, al
though a German victory did seem highly probable.

Under that circumstance,

the leaders at Vichy, including Pdtain, deemed it wise and necessary to
collaborate with Germany, on at least a temporary basis, in economic and
administrative areas.

Military collaboration was avoided or refused by

Vichy for political and military reasons.

If Vichy would have entered

into any kind of military alliance with Germany, which was highly unlikely
given the state of the French armed forces, excluding the navy and colonial
a ny, the political consequences would have been grave and Vichy would have
lost much of the little prestige it had managed to retain with the French
people.

Any such reversal of military alliances would have been profit

able if Germany was the ultimate victor in the larger war.
Toward the beginning of 1 9 W , due to the failure of Sea Lion, the
German plan to invade England, to materialize, and the arrival of Lend
Lease destroyers in Britain, the previous positive convictions of a Ger
man victory at Vichy were being questioned and were slowly fading.

French

public opinion, united in the hatred of the "Boche," also colored Petain's
attitudes and policy.

Negotiation was the key word to Petain,

He desired

to use it as a temporizing tool to allow France to exist until better times.
Always in his mind was the comparison of the situation of France in 1$&0
with the situation of Prussia after Jena.
like rise became an obsession.

22

2lHytier, F.F.P.. pp. 1^0-149.
22Aron, Vichy Regime.' p. 186.

His hopes for a similar phoenix-

2i
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Most extensively used and most helpful of the documentary sources
was the Documents on German Foreign Policy. This is, of course, the major
source for any subject dealing vdth the foreign relations of the Third
Reich. For this paper it was especially useful for the communications
toand from Berlin and Paris that were reprinted. These gave a good pic
ture of the basic German attitudes and goals regarding occupied France.
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The Garmon edition of the trial of Marshal Petain was useful in some
areas. It consists of the testimony of French leaders regarding the
machinations of the Vichy government in both domestic and international
fields. I used it as a source only when I could corroborate the data in
other sources since I have a somewhat illogical distrust of sources rely
ing on the testimony of men accused of offenses similar to those of the
defendant.
The documentary volume of de Gaulle1s Memoirs was far more helpful
than the companion narrative. Although I tried to skirt the issue of de
Gaulle as much as possible for fear of getting hopelessly bogged down,
this work was helpful in the instances I did include regarding de Gaulle.
Included in the work were many official memos and communiques to and from
London. The whole picture was not always presented in these memos since
the British were at that time still unwilling to provide de Gaulle with
the total scope of their intentions. Often the meaning of the messages
included are altered when examining the communications not revealed to
de Gaulle. The Fuhrer Conferences were only marginally helpful sinde they
dealt mainly with events succeeding the period of this paper. What did
apply was often viewed in retrospect, which can lead to interpretations!
difficulties. The Hoover Institute publication France During the German
Occupation was extremely helpful in forming conclusions about Pd'tain. Es
pecially helpful was the deposition of Jacques Chevalier in which he re
lated the personal motives of the Marshal as revealed to him in personal
conversations ■vdth Petain.
The Schmitt work on the; secret diplomatic contacts between France
and Britain in late 1$A0 was quite helpful, although much of the material
was covered in other sources. It served a useful purpose, however, that
of corroboration. It contained many of the official copies of the agree
ments reached during that period, e.g., the Rougier "gentleman's agree
ment” and the Halifax-Chevalier accord.
The U.S State Department's annual Foreign Relations of the United
States volume was interesting and was used mainly to get different view
points from the French and British sources. I used it mostly for the
attitudes revealed to American diplomatic agents by the various person
alities at Vichy and to compare these attitudes vdth the policies there
after enacted. The Trial of the Ma.ior War Criminals and Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression were rerely cited but were used to confirm material gotten
from other sources, especially the Documents on German Foreign Policy.
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Auphan *s work on the French Navy is an excellent account of the actions
of that force during the period of this paper when the French fleet was
the most important diplomatic tool of the Vichy government. Auphan, as
Minister of Merchant Marine at Vichy, was naturally privy to much documen
tary information so the work is quite well, documented and was helpful in
my discussions of the role of the French fleet.
Of the two works by Churchill Their Finest Hour was more useful. Blood.
Sweat, and Tears is a compilation of his wartime speeches and as such ex
hibits only Churchill's public attitudes on the various problems. Since
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the British "foreign policy'series volume for 1$&0 has only very recently
been published and was unavailable to me Churchill's history of the war
provided me with a great deal of documentary material that was unavailable
elsewhere. The work is liberally spiced with official memos, communiques,
and orders that, in spite of Churchill's obvious point of view, give an
excellent documentary review of the events of Franco-British diplomatic
relations from June, 19^0 to February, 19^1.
The Ciano works were quite helpful in that they provided a rare
first-hand account of the diplomatic activities of the Third Reich told
from a non-German perspective. I used them mostly for personal reactions
and attitudes of the German leaders as witnessed by the Italian foreign
minister. Since Italy was concerned with many of the same problems re
garding occupied France as was Germany, Ciano spends a fair amount of
time discussing these problems. Hitler's Secret Conversations were of
some value but, as was the case with the Ftihrer Naval Conferences, most
of the material discussed dealt with a later time period. It was helpful,
however, in formulating a clearer picture of Hitler's attitudes toward
France. Haider's Jonroal was a very valuable source on German plana and
attitudes.. After the D.G.F.P. series it was the most often used German
source. Haider, as chief of the A m y General Staff, attended the major
conferences and kept detailed notes on the happenings and results thereof.
As strictly topical works Hoare's Ambassador on a Special Mission
and Spear's Assignment to Catastrophe were excellent. Hoare's work deals
with his contacts with French diplomats in Madrid where he was the British
Ambassador. Spears, as liason officer to the French High Command and
later to de Gaulle, provides detailed accounts of the political situation
in France shortly before and after the fall. The section on the British
attempts to prevent the signing of an armistice were especially good.
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In terms of usefullness to this paper all other works pale in the
light of Hytier's Two Years of French. Foreign Policy. The work is ex
tremely well documented and thus of great help bibliographically. This
has to be the authoritative source on the foreign relations of Vichy
France from 1940-1942. On a subject that invites moral judgments and
opinions Hytier has retained her scrupulous objectivity throughout. A
great majority of the footnotes in the work were checked and proved to
have been judiciously and honestly used. Aron's work has long been con
sidered the definitive source on Vichy France. It gives excellent accounts
of the internal machinations of the government as applied to foreign rel
ations. It has a slight pro-P6tain bias but still was an excellent source.
Of the biographies, Cole and Warner have provided the best efforts.
Cole relies on personal accounts and memoirs bibliographically, the result
of which was a well-integrated and detailed personalized account of Laval.
Warner provides an excellent character study of Laval, especially in regard
to his attempts at foreign relations with Germany.
Toynbee's Survey of International Affairs is a good starting place
for any topic dealing with diplomatic relations. Several excellent art
icles were included and were of great help. Langer's Our Vichy Gamble
dealt mainly with Franco-American relations but had some valuable material
on Franco-British and Franco-German relations as well. Shirer's monumen
tal work was an excellent, minutely detailed account of the political

85

decline of the Third Republic and the consequent military disaster. The
White work on de Gaulle was of great help bibliographically although I
attempted to stay away from the de Gaulle problem as much as possible.
The rest of the works cited were used sparingly since most of the infor
mation they contained could be found in other sources.
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